072357P.pdf   09/09/2011  United States  v.  Taylor Bloate
   U.S. Court of Appeals Case No:  07-2357
   U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis   
   [PUBLISHED] [Benton, Author, with Riley, Chief Judge, and Gibson,
   Circuit Judge]
   Criminal case - criminal law. For the Court's prior opinion in the matter,
   see U.S. v. Bloate, 534 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2008). Reversed and remanded
   by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Bloate v. U.S., 130 S. Ct.
   1345 (2010). Government did not waive its argument that a period of time
   was excludable under Section 3161(h)(1)(D) of the Speedy Trial Act;
   Bloate's waiver of pretrial motions is not "any pretrial motion" under
   subparagraph (D) of the section which excludes delay resulting from any
   pretrial motion, as the Supreme Court has interpreted the subparagraph as
   measuring time actually consumed by consideration and disposition of a
   pretrial motion and a waiver presents nothing for the court to consider; as
   such the period in question is only excludable if accompanied by district
   court findings and, in the absence of any findings, the period was not
   excludable; since the period was not excludable, a total of 75 days elapsed
   between defendant's indictment and the beginning of his trial, and his
   rights under the Act were violated; the indictment must be dismissed, and
   the district court should determine on remand whether the dismissal is
   with or without prejudice.
  
072357P.pdf   07/25/2008  United States  v.  Taylor Bloate
   U.S. Court of Appeals Case No:  07-2357
   U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis   
   [PUBLISHED] [Benton, Author, with Riley and John R. Gibson, Circuit Judges]
   Criminal case - Criminal law and sentencing. Pretrial motion
   preparation time may be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.
   Sec. 3161(h), if the court specifically grants time for that purpose; here,
   the district court expressly extended the deadline for filing pretrial
   motions at defendant's request, and that time must be excluded from the
   Speedy Trial Act calculations; afer examining all of the included and
   excluded time in the case, the court concluded there was no Speedy Trial
   Act violation in the case; defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
   his right to file pretrial motions, and the district court did not err in
   refusing to hear them; defendant specifically agreed his proffer statements
   would be admissible, and the district court did not err in admitting his
   statements concerning ownership of guns and drugs; evidence was
   sufficient to show defendant knowingly possessed drugs and cocaine;
   sentence can be enhanced by prior convictions.