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ORAL ARGUMENT

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## PROCEEDINGS

(April 2, 2019)
THE BAILIFF: All rise. The Honorable
Michael J. Melloy, United States Court of Appeals for
the 8th Circuit, serving as Special Master in the
Original Jurisdiction Matter 141.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Please be seated.
This is the hearing in connection with the case of Texas versus New Mexico, Colorado, and United States as intervener, United States Supreme Court Original Number 141.

Let me start by asking the parties to enter their appearances, starting with United States.

MR. MACFARLANE: Good morning, Your Honor. Stephen MacFarlane from the Department of Justice on behalf of the United States. I'm joined at counsel table by my colleagues from the Department of Justice: Judith Coleman, James DuBois, Lee Leininger, and from the Department of the Interior Office of the Solicitor, Shelly Randel and Chris Rich. Thank you.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Texas?
MR. SOMACH: Yes, Your Honor. Stuart Somach on behalf of the State of Texas. With me at counsel table are Darren McCarty. Mr. McCarty is the Deputy Attorney General for the State of Texas for the civil
litigation.
Priscilla Hubenak, who is behind me, she is the chief of the Environmental Section of the State Attorney General's Office.

Also at counsel table is Theresa Barfield with my office, Francis Goldsberry, also with my office. Behind them is Robert Hoffman and Sarah Cline of my office and of record in this case.

I also wanted to introduce Mr. Pat Gordon, who is the Texas Rio Grande commissioner, who is in attendance today, along with Suzy Valentine, who is the engineer advisor of Mr. Gordon, and also Brooke Paup, who is a commissioner on the Texas Water Development Program.

Thank you.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: New Mexico?
MR. ROMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. David Roman on behalf of the State of New Mexico. With me at counsel table is Lisa Thompson, and behind me is Michael Kopp as well.

I would also like to take the time to introduce Deputy Attorney General Tania Maestas, and our brand-new state engineer, John D'Antonio, and his general counsel, Greg Ridgley.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Colorado?

MR. WALLACE: Good morning, Your Honor. Chad Wallace for the State of Colorado.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: All right. Let me go through the amici. Anyone here from the Albuquerque Renewal County Water Authority?

MR. BROCKMANN: Yes, Your Honor. Jim Brockmann from the Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Utility Authority. And with me is Mr. John Stomp, the chief operating officer; and Mr. Peter Auh, the general counsel for the Water Authority.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: How about the City of El Paso?

MR. CAROOM: Doug Caroom, Your Honor, with the City of El Paso. With me is my counsel, Susan Maxwell; John Balliew, general manager of El Paso Water Utilities; and Daniel Ortiz.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: City of Las Cruces?
MR. STEIN: Good morning, Your Honor. This is Jay Stein representing the amicus curiae City of Las Cruces.

Let me introduce the utilities director for Las Cruces joint utilities, Dr. Jorge Garcia, who is in court with me today.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you.
Elephant Butte Irrigation District?

MS. BARNCASTLE: Good morning, Your Honor.
Samantha Barncastle for the Elephant Butte Irrigation District. And my client sends their regards. They were not able to attend today due to our annual spring trip to D.C.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I'm sorry, who cannot attend?

MS. BARNCASTLE: My client.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. I'm sure you'll report back.

Let's see, El Paso County Water Improvement District?

MS. O'BRIEN: Yes. Good morning, Your Honor. Maria O'Brien on behalf of El Paso County Water Improvement District No. 1. And in the courtroom today is the district's engineer, Al Blair.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Hudspeth County
Conservation and Reclamation District?
MR. MILLER: Good morning, Your Honor. I'm Drew Miller on behalf of the Hudspeth County Conservation and Reclamation District No. 1.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. I assume nobody is here for the State of Kansas.

New Mexico Pecan Growers?
MS. DAVIDSON: Good morning, Your Honor.

Tessa Davidson on behalf of New Mexico Pecan Growers. THE SPECIAL MASTER: Anyone here from New Mexico State University?

MR. UTTON: Good morning, Your Honor. John Utton representing NMSU.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: And $I$ think that's it. Before I -- well, I'm sorry.

MR. JONES: Good morning, Your Honor. My name is Alvin Jones. I am appearing on behalf of the petitioning Southern Rio Grande Diversified Crop Farmers Association. We filed a petition to --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I'm sorry. You're representing who?

MR. JONES: Southern Rio Grande Diversified Crop Farmers Association. We filed a motion for me to appear as amicus in this matter, and I believe that's up for consideration this morning.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: You filed a motion for
leave to do what, appear as amicus or intervenor?
MR. JONES: Amicus, Your Honor.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: I don't think I have that motion. When did you file it?

MR. JONES: Six, eight weeks ago, Your Honor.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Let me -- we'll
take that up after, don't let me forget. We'll take
that up at the end. But $I$ don't recall seeing that motion, but maybe I'm -- it's possible it got overlooked.

Go ahead.
MS. DAVIDSON: Your Honor, his motion was filed in conjunction with our joint brief with New Mexico Pecan Growers and the amicus brief.

So the brief was filed jointly by Southern Rio Grande Diversified Crop Farmers Association and New Mexico Pecan Growers, and his motion was filed at that time.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: So it's in the brief?
MS. DAVIDSON: It was a separate motion, but they did file jointly in a brief with New Mexico Pecan Growers.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: All right. Anybody else in the courtroom before $I$ turn to the folks who are on the phone?
(No verbal response.)
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. All right. Could I get appearances then of who is on the phone, please.

MR. SIMON: Your Honor, it's Robert Simon, attorney for Pre-Federal Claimants, monitoring the hearing.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Anyone else on the
phone?
(No verbal response.)
THE SPECIAL MASTER: All right. Thank you.
All right. Before we get into the arguments on the motions, I want to bring up a couple preliminary matters.

First of all, on the motion to intervene by the Pre-Federal Claimants, the essence, as far as I understand it, is strictly with the Supreme Court at this point, and there's nothing we need to do on that today or I really have no jurisdiction over that.

I checked the docket, I think on Friday, maybe yesterday. Has the extension to respond been granted?

MR. ROMAN: It has, Your Honor. My understanding is that it was granted essentially orally by the clerk of the Supreme Court, and I'm not aware whether they have entered an actual order granting that because there was some delay in receiving the paper copy, they only received it electronically, but it has been granted.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: The only thing I will say about that particular matter is I would appreciate receiving courtesy copies of whatever's filed because I had not known that there had been a petition for
interventions filed because it had been filed with the Supreme Court.

So when you file your pleadings in connection with anything, if you'd send a copy, and then if you can just put it in our docket, it will be helpful. MR. ROMAN: Of course.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Then the other issue I wanted to mention was we got -- I received an e-mail yesterday from our clerk in Saint Louis who was -- said she had received a call from the Hudspeth County Conservation folks and asking if we had received a letter that you sent last April, which we did not.

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, if $I$ may speak very briefly to that?

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Could you come up? I'm having a little trouble hearing in the back of the courtroom.

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, I'm Drew Miller representing the Hudspeth County Conservation and Reclamation District No. 1.

Your Honor, I apologize, when I had -- when I asked the secretary of my firm to call the clerk yesterday, I did not -- there's no request, there's no intention to bring this to your attention or to take up the parties' time with this.

This is a letter that we filed about a year ago, and the matters are actually moot, and so I don't -- it doesn't -- in my opinion, doesn't need to be considered at this point.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. All right. We'll get it filed in this case. I think the problem was it was actually served on Mr. -- on the prior Special Master.

MR. MILLER: It could be. My assistant at the time is no longer with my firm so I can't even ask him what he did.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, the service list indicates that so that's probably what happened.

MR. MILLER: Okay. Thank you.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: All right. All right. Before we get into the motions and argument -- and let me say, the time limits $I$ set out in the order are more aspirational. We're not going to put the clock on you like some appellate courts would, but this is more of a -- while $I$ hope we can keep it to a certain general time frame, if we run over, we run over. It's not going to be the end of the world, but -- so you can keep that in mind.

A couple sort of preliminary observations that you might want to think about is also when you
talk about your motions, both Texas and United States have moved to strike the equitable defenses. And this may apply to other claims as well.

I think at this stage of the proceeding, some of these motions may be hard to rule on as a matter of fact. Texas may be correct in its assessment that laches and equitable estoppel and defenses such as that don't apply to compact violations going forward.

But $I$ don't know what Texas is asking for at this point. If you're asking for 60 years of damages and saying that they've been in -- New Mexico has been in noncompliance since 1938 and that you're asking for X hundreds of millions of dollars of damages, then laches may become a defense. I just don't know. I don't think all these motions can be decided as a matter of law without some factual context within which to decide them.

The other -- the other thing I'm concerned about is what about cities that have been using water with acquiescence for 40 or 50 years, you know, are we going to -- I don't know where those fit into this whole issue of -- of the affirmative defenses that Texas -- I mean that Kansas -- excuse me, the affirmative defenses that New Mexico has raised.

And then finally, on this issue of whether or
not Supreme Court permission is required to file counterclaims, it's a -- that's a bit of a tricky issue, and $I$ don't know if that should be the subject of a motion to strike at the Supreme Court level or whether that's something I should rule on.

I will note that in our research, we found one case that directly discussed this issue, and that's Kansas v. Nebraska, Original Number 126. And in that case, this very issue was raised, that -- that

Nebraska's counterclaim should be struck because Nebraska had not sought leave of the Supreme Court to file the counterclaims.

All the Supreme Court said is the motion is denied. Now, they didn't do any analysis; they didn't say anything about it. Whether that's present for this issue or not, I don't know. But anyway, that's something we need to think about.

So having said that, I guess we'll get started and let Texas go first.

MR. SOMACH: Good morning, Your Honor.
Stuart Somach. We have three motions that are before you right now. The first deals with exactly what is the status of the case and whether or not -- what happened before the Special Master, the first Special Master and the Court prior to the remand back down has
any relevance to how we move forward.
Second one is the $12(c)$ motions in which we have argued two things: We've argued, number one, that New Mexico was obligated to seek leave, and I'll address that in more detail, and then we've also substantively taken a look at the $12(\mathrm{c})$ motion, particularly the one cause of action under the Miscellaneous Purposes Act that refers to Texas.

We also have a Rule 56 motion with respect to the affirmative defenses. I'm not sure exactly how to -- how to deal with that one because the law is what we believe the law is, and then the factual question that you raise is an interesting one, and $I$ have no objection to deferring final resolution of that issue until there is further factual development on what Texas intends specifically to ask for in terms of a remedy. That may alleviate the concern that you have.

Although I am cognizant of the damage issue with respect to reliance by cities, I am not particularly of the mind that that's a reason to -- to delay a ruling mainly because it's within New Mexico's power to decide -- assuming you and the court decide that they enacted inappropriately under the compact, it's up to New Mexico to figure out how they're going to rearrange the resources they have in order to ensure
that cities, vis-à-vis farmers, vis-à-vis whomever else is relying upon water, is to be supplied water; that utilizing a violation of the compact as a rationale for New Mexico to get out of this obligation and take water that was otherwise apportioned to Texas runs right into the case law that we cited associated with those equitable defenses in terms of rewriting in terms of the compact.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Can I ask you a question, sort of at the outset, and this is sort of an overarching issue on many of these motions. You have just made the statement that water is allocated to Texas, and you use that phrase throughout your pleadings, but you say the water's not allocated to New Mexico. Why is there a difference?

MR. SOMACH: Actually, this goes to the question -- since I've started inartfully in terms of utilizing terms, let me correct myself immediately.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: No, but you used
that -- I mean, this is isn't the first -- that's one of the questions I've had from the very beginning when I was reading your motions is that you repeatedly refer to water allocated to Texas and that you're standing in the shoes of the Texas citizens who are being deprived of their rightful allocation of water, but you say New

Mexico has no water allocation and they have no right to stand in the shoes of their citizens who may be rightfully depriving them of water. So, again, why is -- where is the distinction?

MR. SOMACH: Well, let me begin with this question, and $I$ believe it became a big issue with the briefing and what $I$ had written, what we had written, was that states get apportionments under the compact and that the water that is then divvied up is allocated pursuant to the apportionment.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: So are you saying New Mexico gets 57 percent under the apportionment, Texas gets 43 percent under apportionment, and then it gets into the allocation?

MR. SOMACH: Actually, I'm saying something quite different, and $I$ think this really impresses your question, perhaps.

The compact apportions water between -- you know, there's a requirement that Colorado deliver X amount of water at the Colorado-New Mexico state line. Then New Mexico has the Article IV obligation to deposit water into Elephant Butte Reservoir for Texas. And then it gets all the -- it gets all the rest of the water as its apportionment.

The question then becomes does New Mexico
also have an apportionment too, and I'll use -- these phrases are just more sophisticated than just cutting it up 57 and 43 percent because of the return flows and the issue that we're really dealing with is actually more than a hundred percent of the water.

In order for everybody to get their water, you'd actually have to have 120 percent of water because you've got to reuse the water over and over again in order to make everything -- everything work.

The question then is, what does New Mexico get within the reservoir? What amount of water is apportioned under the compact to them?

Texas has taken the position, and it is still our position, that essentially all the water in the reservoir is water apportioned to Texas. And we cited for those propositions the fact that it's the Texas Rio Grande commissioner that can order certain things to happen with respect to debts, credits, and other requirements associated with the operation of the reservoir, that New Mexico doesn't have that power.

That power is vested solely in the State of Texas, the Texas Rio Grande commissioner, by the compact.
And so that essentially our view is that all the water in the reservoir belongs to Texas subject to EBID's preexisting contract, which clearly was
recognized in the compact with the United States, which is the 57 percent you're talking about, and the 60,000 acre-feet that's subject to the treaty the United States has with Mexico.

Now, that's what the compact set up. Now, there's language in the Special Master's report that there is an apportionment to New Mexico. And what we've said about that is, you know, as a practical matter, it doesn't make any difference because what the Special Master also said was New Mexico had relinquished all dominion and control over that 57 percent of the water and that it also had agreed to the arrangement by which the United States would deliver that water to EBID subject to the contract that the United States has with EBID.

And the reason why you have to look at it as a unity like that is because it is essentially a closed system; that unless you are controlling sort of reclamation utilization of the contracts to 57 percent, you can't ensure that New Mexico -- that Texas gets its 43 percent, because you have to take a look at depletions within EBID, and you have to take a look at return flows and other issues.

And if it's not a closed system that looks at those things, then exactly what has happened does
happen when New Mexico comes in and authorizes non-EBID water uses to pump groundwater to a degree where the river is no longer in contact with the groundwater basin, and all the return flows drop into the groundwater basin or are acclaimed by New Mexico separate and apart from the compact, then Texas gets shorted, and there's no way to fix that until you create the unity again.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: To what extent is there water in the Lower Rio Grande, if any, that is not project water? You talk about --

MR. SOMACH: It's all project water.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: You talk about return flow. There are no major tributaries that would flow into the Rio Grande within that area that would be nonproject water?

MR. SOMACH: Well, there are no tributaries. There are, however, weather flows and other, what I would call and what the experts will call, accretions into the river, that's additions. There are also depletions, natural losses during that period of time -- or during that stretch of the river.

And then historically, in 1938 there was a tributary flow from the groundwater basin, which doesn't exist anymore. All of that was accounted for
in the compact, and it also belonged to the unity that I just described; that there was no -- in fact, and these are factual issues which we'll bring to bear, in the 1937 and 1938 engineer reports, that supported the compact, the engineers concluded that there was no available water below Elephant Butte, at all, that if you were going to have any more development post 1938, you were going to have to bring in and augment supplies from bringing water in from outside.

So the direct answer to your question is no, there is no water below Elephant Butte Reservoir that isn't accounted for.

Now, the groundwater issue is interesting because we've never said that New Mexico doesn't have some right to the groundwater. But what we've said is you can't operate the groundwater basin, you can't allow pumping of the groundwater basin to be so large that you draw down that basin so that the system, the closed system that I talked about, no longer works. And those are hard and factual issues that we'll put before you as we move forward.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Okay. Well, I got you offtrack. I'll let you go back.

MR. SOMACH: Actually, I -- we started, I think, in the context of talking a little bit about the
affirmative defenses, which I actually didn't want to spend much time with at all in my argument.

I'd like to focus most of what I want to say affirmatively with respect to the motion that we have, I'll call it the law of the case motion, but it's much more sophisticated than that, and it involves a lot of issues, and $I$ wanted to provide some context to that motion.

I don't want to repeat everything that we wrote in the brief other than responding to questions you have about that. But the discussion needs to be grounded in New Mexico's motion to dismiss. After all, that was what was before the Special Master and the Court.

Now, the motion was based upon two basic arguments: One was that the there were no express provisions in the 1938 compact that it violated. That is, at that point in time, they were arguing no state line delivery obligation and that New Mexico's compact obligation ended when they deposited or delivered water into Elephant Butte Reservoir.

There already was a plain rank in the compact, this was delivered to the Elephant Butte Reservoir, not to the Texas state line. They also argued in that context that the compact does not
require New Mexico to maintain depletions within the Rio Grande Basin and New Mexico below Elephant Butte Reservoir at the levels that existed in 1938. Those are -- that's the first argument that they made, that argument.

The second argument they made was that below Elephant Butte Reservoir the use of water is controlled by New Mexico state law. They cited California v. United States, Section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act, and then they argued that there were alternative forms, that the New Mexico adjudication court was a perfect place to argue -- to argue these cases, and they argued that the -- that the district court in Albuquerque had a case dealing with the operating agreement and that was the place to argue those things.

Now, I noticed in their briefs on our motion here, they now argue that their position was that the compact ended at Elephant Butte Reservoir and did not apply below the reservoir. That's -- that's what they say. That's all they say that they argued for. But that's not what the motion to dismiss dealt with, and that's not what -- the way Special Master Grimsal understood their argument.

What I just articulated to you as their two positions comes right out of both their briefs and the

Special Master -- first Special Master's articulation of their position.

That was the second time they made every one of those arguments. Because if you go back and look at their opposition to the State of Texas's petition to file the complaint in this case, those were exactly the same issues they put before the Court there and which were rejected in that context by the court when the Court allowed us to file our -- our complaint. All parties agreed that the compact was unamended. THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, I'm not sure I agree with that.

MR. SOMACH: I'm sorry, which --
THE SPECIAL MASTER: That -- you may be
reading too much into what the Supreme Court decided when they allowed you to file the complaint. Because they specifically also said, and we invite New Mexico to file a motion to dismiss. I think -- I think the Supreme Court did nothing more than say based on the face of the complaint, there's enough here to go forward. We'll decide the issues that you're talking about in the context of a motion to dismiss.

MR. SOMACH: And just to be clear, I don't disagree with what you said. All I'm saying is that was the second time we had briefed all of those issues
in this case.
The Court -- what the Court did, I agree with you, is allow them to file and gave them leave to file the motion to dismiss. In the context, however, of their motion to dismiss, and in the context of the arguments they made before the court in terms of their opposition, they said that the compact was unambiguous, that there was no ambiguity in the compact.

The United States, when it intervened in the case and subsequently has said the compact was unambiguous, Texas has always said the compact was unambiguous.

When the Special Master took up this case, there were no factual issues before the Special Master. He made a point of saying that several times. I have remarked that there is a lot of discussion that is not a legal discussion in the Special Master's report, but he explains that that's appropriate because it -- he provides context.

If you take a look at New Mexico's motion to dismiss, take a look at their opposition to Texas's leave to file, and if you look at the Supreme Court's March decision, all use background information to set it up so that the fact the Special Master did that is not remarkable, but what he said was: I haven't relied
upon any of this because I don't need to, because the compact is unambiguous.

The question of ambiguity is a question of
law. That's a legal question. And the resolution of whether -- of what an ambiguous compact means is also a legal question. And when the Special Master found that the text and structure of the 1938 compact was unambiguous, he went through and he specifically articulated the legal determinations which were necessary for him to reach that conclusion upon which he recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied. THE SPECIAL MASTER: Can I ask you a question about this ambiguity? One of the things that $I$ was thinking about as $I$ was reviewing this last week and over the weekend was at the time the compact was negotiated, $I$ assume that both Texas and New Mexico anticipated the possibility that there would be further development on both sides of the border, certainly El Paso is a lot bigger than it was 60 years ago, and you have Las Cruces and so on that are -- that have grown, what was -- was there any thought given to where they'd get water, I mean, and how this compact would play into both the economic development that might occur on either side of the border and the possibility that as time goes on acres that are within both of the
irrigation districts may go out of production and they don't -- and they don't need the water? Was it always thought that you'd have to contract with the irrigation districts to get water?

MR. SOMACH: The short answer --
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Is there a historical context?

MR. SOMACH: Yes, there is a historical context, and as we talk about municipal use, because that is an issue that's been raised in the case that we'll have to deal with, the answer to that question is yes. El Paso, not so much Las Cruces, but El Paso was certainly involved around -- in 1938 and concerned about water supply with the knowledge that it would have to obtain some water supply through the project in order to meet its needs, which is exactly what it did years ago entering into the contracts with both the United States and -- and the district in order to obtain part of its -- its water supply.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, was it always anticipated that there would be surplus water available for contracting with municipalities?

MR. SOMACH: No. As I indicated earlier, there was no surplus water. It was all accounted for.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I mean, it's not that
it's not accounted for, but what $I$ mean is, do the irrigation districts need all the water that they were going to get, or was it anticipated that out of the, what is it, 790,000 acre-feet that's released every year, that it was always anticipated there would be some available for municipalities?

MR. SOMACH: No, no. No. Remember, 70/90 is a full supply of that. But using that -- that -- it was assumed that all that water was going to be for irrigation. That was the assumption. And so even now, if the municipal -- Las Cruces just pumps, and that's part of our complaint. But El Paso, in fact, did what the compact negotiators anticipated, and that was that they entered into the contracts with the district and with -- with the United States, and we'll put on -evidence of this in, among other things, they return water through their wastewater and other treatment facilities so that it's not a one-for-one net loss, they return water, plus they pay for other water that they take. So it's all wrapped up in those contracts and will be part of the factual case.

But the fundamental answers that the question poses, as I said before, it was all appropriate. There was no surplus water involved. And so to the extent that the cities were going to have to get water, it was
known they were going to have to get it from the available supply.

I suspect there was some belief that for a while you could pump groundwater. There certainly is the ability to pump some groundwater, which is additional water, at least to the point where you haven't had an adverse impact on the way the system operates.

Returning to what $I$ was -- what $I$ was saying is the five points that we put before you as the five issues are -- they track exactly what the Special Master found in his report.

Now, New Mexico took exception to what the Special Master's conclusion and recommendations were, and -- not the recommendation but the conclusions, the legal conclusions the Special Master made in order to support his recommendation, and then they filed exceptions.

Now, those exceptions, if you look at them, track -- same argument was made -- you know, in terms of opposition of our filing of the case, same arguments that were made in opposition to the motion to dismiss, they never withdrew their motion to dismiss. Moreover, they never withdrew these exceptions. And so that actually was the one, two, third time we briefed the
same issues.
We know that the Court both denied New
Mexico's motion to dismiss and also denied New Mexico's exceptions, and we cited the Raddatz case, and the Raddatz case was also cited, I believe, by New Mexico.

It's interesting that in the Raddatz case discussion, which is the applicable discussion of the Supreme Court Special Masters, it talks about the fact that, yeah, there -- you know, those reports are advisory only, yet the Court regularly acts on the basis of the master's report, but then it says "and exceptions thereto," which indicates that the Court does look at the exceptions, that they're just not, you know, set aside and ignored by the Court. But with all of what I've said in mind, I think that the real question is, is what is going to govern this case as we move forward before you? It is not, in a sense, where the Supreme Court might, after considering the Special Master's report exceptions, rule in a manner which is at odds either with the report or the exceptions.

The first report, as it addresses the issues that Texas is involved within the case, it exists. It's there. It's never been rejected by the Court. It exists as a -- as a pillar of some sort in this
litigation. That would have been the case if no exceptions had been filed in that hypothetical situation. It would have been there.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Can I ask you about two of your specific determinations?

MR. SOMACH: Yes.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Two and five. Two says
the text of the 1938 compact requires New Mexico to relinquish control over the water, and 5 says that New Mexico law plays no role in the dispute.

I'm not sure that the United States entirely agrees with that assessment, but I'll let

Mr. MacFarlane speak to that. But at least to the extent that they need to protect your interest, don't -- doesn't Texas law --

MR. SOMACH: New Mexico.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: -- New Mexico law, and don't they have to control the water below the damn at least so that they protect your interest, if for no other reason.

MR. SOMACH: Yes, those articulations that I've just made come from the Special Master's report. So I pulled them right out of the Special Master's report.

I believe that it was always our -- and it
has been our belief, and we briefed it in the context of the motions to dismiss themselves, that the proper exercise of New Mexico state law is to support the compact, which includes not exercising law that would allow them to allow others to take and to exercise their power to preclude that from occurring.

In fact, in our briefs we cited not only provisions of state law, but we also cited those provisions of state law which adopted the compact which bound them to that situation.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: So then that
articulation is not correct. I mean, what you really are saying is that New Mexico law applies, but it must be applied in such a way as to protect the interests of Texas.

MR. SOMACH: Yes. The statement itself is a response to the New Mexico -- and this is the context for that. The statement itself is a response to Texas -- to New Mexico's argument that it only had to deliver water to Elephant Butte and that everything below Elephant Butte was governed by New Mexico state law including the appropriation and application of the law.

That's how you get into the adjudication court, which finds -- you know, which doesn't give the
same priority to the compact that -- that we believe that the Special Master provided for in that first report.

So contextually, the statement is while New Mexico state law has nothing to do with the appropriation and utilization and allocation of water below Elephant Butte, it certainly applies to preclude interference with deliveries that otherwise go to Texas. So that's the context that the Special Master wrote on.

What I -- the point $I$ was making in the context of the existing Special Master's report is the fact that if there had been no exceptions, it would be there. In fact, there were exceptions, and the Court rejected those exceptions.

That's got to mean something in the context of -- and here's the critical issue -- where do we go from here? Do we ignore that report and those legal findings in terms of compact interpretation, or are we forced to, for a fourth time, ignore the Special Master's first report and move forward and relitigate essentially what we've done for the last six years?

If the first Special Master was still the Special Master, there's no question that we would pick up where from where he left off. I recognize that's
not the actual situation we have here, but looking at every kind of concept of judicial efficiency and resource development to go do this, whether it's a third or a fourth time, depending upon our earlier discussion, we've been around this. We have a report. That report is there. It's never been rejected. The exceptions to that report, however, have clearly been rejected.

Let me touch quickly on the $12(\mathrm{c})$ motion record because I know --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I've taken up quite a bit of your time.

MR. SOMACH: Well, no, it's fine. It
is -- our motion is pretty simple. It basically says, look, filing what are essentially complaints to Supreme Court is serious business.

The Court -- you know, certainly if this was the complaint in the first instance, the Court clearly gets to approve that. We cited a whole bunch of orders from the Court where counterclaims were -- in fact, sought leave, and the Court in some of those denied it, and in some of those granted leave to file those.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Although several of those involved amendment to counterclaims, some of those cases.

MR. SOMACH: They did, but that's --
THE SPECIAL MASTER: And that's exactly the argument that they made in Texas $v$. Colorado, to strike counterclaims. They said -- Colorado said, I guess it was -- yeah, it was Kansas, and Nebraska was on it. Colorado basically said -- or, no, it was Kansas.

Kansas basically said, Listen, you have to go through all of these hoops to file a complaint, and it's a very serious matter, exactly what you just said, and the Supreme Court takes its gatekeeping responsibility very seriously. So you ought to have to go through the same hoops to file a counterclaim that may raise even more issues. And like I said, Supreme Court just said motion to strike is denied. And I don't know if that -- there's not much analysis there, but --

MR. SOMACH: No, there's not. But, again, there is a whole list of cases that we provided where the Court clearly acted on that. You know, it is interesting, you know, in fact, you point out that -New Mexico makes a big deal out of this and says somehow we were writing off on Kansas's template, which I didn't -- I can assure you we didn't write off anybody's template.

But the point being, they're weaving a lot
into a summary denial when it comes to the issue you've raised, yet they had written off the overruling of those exceptions as a -- what did they use? They used a housekeeping instruction. I mean, if anything could be a housekeeping instruction from the United States Supreme Court on exceptions that have been filed, I don't think that's it.

But they write that off as a housekeeping instruction, and then they pile all of this in, in terms of an explanation of the only case that they cite that makes that point. I'm not going to argue that it is a summary denial, but it is, nonetheless, a denial. And $I$ think that that, in and of itself, is significant when you put it together with all of the other issues that -- all the other cases that we've cited there.

A couple of other points in regard to that is these weren't just -- there are two causes of action that they've added as counterclaims which are basically mirror causes of action to ours, but also they're affirmative defenses, and so those issues are going to get litigated anyway one way or the other because they're part and parcel of our claim.

But what they've done is gone much further afield, even though they said they can't go further
afield, by adding issues that have nothing to do with the compact. They are the -- for example, the water supply, the Miscellaneous Purposes Act, the operating agreement.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: The what?
MR. SOMACH: The operating agreement. I
mean, they've got --
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, I -- let's talk about the operating agreement for a minute. I'm having trouble getting my head around how you can say the operating agreement doesn't have anything to do with the compact. Because if you say the compact requires that 57 percent of the water go to Elephant Butte and 43 percent go to El Paso Water District and would have signed all the contracts that they've entered into, and now you have an allocation that totally flips that, how can you say that doesn't affect the compact?

MR. SOMACH: Because notwithstanding what they said, $I$ don't think the operating agreement does that.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, it doesn't make any difference. Whatever the operating agreement says, it says. But if it doesn't allocate the water according to the compact, then what -- how can you say it doesn't affect the compact?

MR. SOMACH: Well, because I'm not sure that I concur that it doesn't allocate the water according to the compact.

With that assumption in mind, my answer to that question is the same answer we gave to the Court when they raised the issue of alternative forms. Because, remember, this operating agreement is currently the subject of a piece of litigation in federal district court that's been stayed, and it's been stayed in order for you and the court to tell us what are the compact apportionments.

Once that is known, then you can take that, in Judge Browning's courtroom or elsewhere, and make a determination in putting the operating agreement up against the compact interpretation as provided by this Court and determine whether or not the operating agreement violates the compact.

To add it to this case encumbers this case and, quite frankly, overly complicates this case with issues that belong elsewhere. They belong elsewhere as a determination of whether or not the operating agreement is consistent or inconsistent with the compact.

It's the same argument, essentially, that says, how did we get sued under the Miscellaneous

Purposes Act, which is a very specific act that talks about who can actually bring suit, you know.

We don't have a miscellaneous purposes contract. New Mexico doesn't have one either so that will really be outstanding under the law, but we're an absolute stranger to those contracts. You have -- they've thrown that in as a cause of action in attempting to, you know, inappropriately bootstrap the compact in here.

You could almost argue that any argument they can concoct becomes a compact argument just by -- just by barely alleging that it would somehow have an adverse effect upon the compact.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I thought the operating agreement was not so much a compact interpretation, if we want to put it that way, but rather, a remedy, that the operating agreement almost assumed that New Mexico was in violation and that, as a remedy, we're going to do this, we're going to enter into this operating agreement that's going to govern going forward in order to remedy the overpumping of groundwater. Am I wrong about what the operating agreement says?

MR. SOMACH: I think I said to Your Honor --
THE SPECIAL MASTER: So we may get into the operating -- even if we don't get into the operating
agreement on contract interpretation, as I understand it, you want a remedy. You don't want just -- I think you're saying you want more than just -- we want to make sure we get our allocation going forward. You want a remedy for past violations. And that's what the operating agreement, as I understood it, was intended to effectuate.

MR. SOMACH: Right. And I think in one of the status conferences I described it as a potential remedy. In its current configuration, I'm not certain that we would agree with it because it uses a different baseline than the one that we think is appropriate. THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, I mean, a couple of the amici, $I$ think it was pecan growers or somebody said, you know, it's not perfect, but it might be a framework for a remedy.

MR. SOMACH: And quite frankly, I'm not sure that we wouldn't be there. But looking at it as a remedy is quite different than having it as a cause of action in a complaint.

I firmly believe that these are the exact questions that you're pondering now that the Supreme Court ought to ponder to determine whether it wants to expand this litigation.

One of the clear things of the Supreme Court
opinion was to say the United States gets in, and one of the reasons was is because they're not expanding the litigation. And then with that in mind, you find -you find out that New Mexico just files a complaint that expands the litigation far beyond.

Now, it might be appropriate, but what we've said is, that's a decision for the Court to make as to whether or not -- as in all cases we cited to, some of them they said yeah, some of them they said no. And that's what we're suggesting, issues of sovereign immunity, issues of standard.

Some of those issues might get sorted out in the context of a briefing with respect to whether these are ever appropriate original action types of issues.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Is there any question in your mind that New Mexico has standing to counterclaim on what you say are basically mirror claims of the compact?

MR. SOMACH: If that's -- believe me, if that's all they had done, I -- notwithstanding the fact that $I$ do think there's a jurisdictional issue here, we would never have -- we would have just moved forward in litigating those issues.

The problem with what they've done is they will have exponentially expanded the scope of this

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litigation into Water Supply Act issues, Miscellaneous Purposes Act issues. I mean, it just goes on in terms of all those issues. That's inappropriate. That is going to -- to expand this litigation far beyond where we thought we were when we came back from the Supreme Court.

They want to relitigate all the issues that were before the Supreme Court, and now they want to expand the issues well beyond what is in the existing piece of original action.

I'm not saying that they are not entitled to try. I'm just saying they have to go and get permission from the Supreme Court to do -- to try. And we will, you know, certainly oppose, but we'll take our position there. That's the right way to do it.

In the meantime, we've got to be moving along with this case so that at least their mirror images and our complaint get resolved in a reasonably -certainly, you know -- I think I told you when I took this case, I knew it might take up the rest of my professional life. I never intended that it would take up my actual life.

This case, we've been at this for six years, and they're suggesting we go back to go, plus we have all kinds of issues that have never been in this case
before.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you.
MR. SOMACH: Thank you.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: I think you're about --
MR. SOMACH: I've exhausted the time.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: All right.
Mr. MacFarlane, I'll let you speak. I want -- I decided rather than press Mr. Somach on the standing issue, I'll talk to you about it. So I'm not going to --

MR. MACFARLANE: Thank you, Your Honor. Steven MacFarlane from the United States. Good morning.

I want to start off by one minor, if $I$ may, one minor correction. The United States did not move for summary, or part of summary judgment, on New Mexico's affirmative defenses. Our $12(c)$ motion was focused just on New Mexico's counterclaims against the United States.

I agree with Mr. Somach that New Mexico's first and fourth counterclaims against Texas, assuming that Your Honor concludes that New Mexico's counterclaims are properly in front of you, that those can proceed, and together with Texas's claim, the United States's claim, that really defines the core of
this litigation.
And that gets me to my starting point here, which from the United States's perspective, this lawsuit is about the relative apportionments of Texas and New Mexico under the Rio Grande compact with respect to the waters that New Mexico delivers to the Elephant Butte Reservoir, what the compact defines as usable water in project storage available for release by the project in accordance with the irrigation demands including deliveries to New Mexico.

Now, contrary to New Mexico's response and reply briefs, the United States does not contend or take the position that New Mexico has no apportionment below Elephant Butte Reservoir, only that its apportionment is undefined by the compact itself.

And this is where I would disagree with Your Honor that the compact provides New Mexico with 57 percent apportionment and Texas with a 43 percent apportionment. That remains to be determined.

The apportionment also would need to account for depletions due to groundwater development, which we contend impair the project, the Rio Grande project's ability to deliver water according to these contracts.

So our position, we agree with the compact
analysis in the first Special Master's report regarding
the role of the project as the vehicle for guaranteeing delivery of Texas's and a part of New Mexico's equitable apportionment of the stream. But we also agree with the first Special Master's conclusion that the delivery obligation on New Mexico under Article IV of the compact requires New Mexico to relinquish dominion and control over the water that goes to Elephant Butte Reservoir and to protect the water released by the project from being captured, interfered with or appropriated after it moves downstream.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: So is it your position, and this is the way I read the Supreme Court decision, that if New Mexico loses dominion and control of the water, it becomes under the jurisdiction of the United States?

MR. MACFARLANE: It is water that the project administers and distributes or releases and then delivers pursuant to the contracts with EBID and EP No. 1 and also the deliveries to Mexico.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, does that mean, then, that you are a proper party for any violations of your duty to administer and release water?

MR. MACFARLANE: We could be potentially, but
here's the key: New Mexico's apportionment below Elephant Butte Reservoir -- and the same is true of

Texas. It's our position that it applies to both -remains to be defined.

There needs to be a decree that allocates what each state is specifically entitled to out of the water that the project administers. Once that decree is entered, and we know with greater certainty what each state has -- and this really gets to the key of our standing argument, which I'll get to in a moment when we review our specialty compacts, but once we have a decree that defines what each state has, then we can look to project operations and determine whether those operations are consistent with that decree.

So if you anticipate a point I expect to make a little later, our position, for example, with regard to New Mexico's counterclaim against the involved operating agreement is -- which we believe is not properly pled and has many flaws, is not that New Mexico can't bring a claim against the United States based on the operating agreement but that the time to do so hasn't ripened up because New Mexico doesn't know what it has by way an apportionment. So we need to get that issue resolved, and that's what we think this case is about.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Do you agree, though, that at the end of the day, whether I actually get into
the operating agreement or not, once we do -- make those determinations about apportionment and so on, that there's -- to the extent the operating agreement is inconsistent, it will have to be changed?

MR. MACFARLANE: Absolutely I agree with that, Your Honor, and I think, frankly --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I mean, to me the operating agreement is sort of a total side issue to this in the sense that once we know what the compact requires, then the operating agreement is going to have to be brought into conformance unless the operating agreement becomes a remedy.

MR. MACFARLANE: I would agree with that assessment, frankly. I think the operating agreement defines how a project in the river currently operates. The Court will say whether the current operation is consistent with an apportionment, and so that's an issue I think for another day, possibly even another forum, but $I$ don't think it means that New Mexico can counterclaim against the United States seeking damages and injunctive relief based upon an alleged nexus between the operating agreement and the compact, which is most vague and attenuated, quite frankly.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, you've raised the issue of sovereign immunity, and I guess I want some
clarification on that. Are you -- I understand that you're arguing that you have not waived sovereign immunity for purposes of money damages; is that right?

MR. MACFARLANE: We have not waived sovereign immunity for money damages. Only Congress can do that. And there is no -- we're not aware of any waiver that will allow claims for money damages, even in an original action, be asserted against the United States.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Have you waived sovereign immunity for purposes of arguing that you are not operating the project in conformance with the compact?

MR. MACFARLANE: We have not waived sovereign immunity for those purposes either, Your Honor. THE SPECIAL MASTER: Why not?

MR. MACFARLANE: Because there is -- we don't see that there is an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity, at least that New Mexico has pled, that -- it hasn't pled it, but that would give the Court, in this proceeding, or that would waive the immunity of the United States in this proceeding, to claims that somehow the operating agreement violates the compact. Hypothetically --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I'm not talking about the operating agreement here. I'm just talking about
how you're doing it, I mean. And as far as what -- New Mexico's plan, I think really what is important is what you have pled in your complaint of intervention, what you are saying to the Supreme Court, why you need to intervene.

And I think Justice Gorsuch basically said you're the agent for New Mexico and Texas. He used the word "agent." So if you're violating your agency agreement, so to speak, are you then subject to suit?

MR. MACFARLANE: I think that is -- let me answer that question this way, Your Honor. I think that is an issue that will have to be adjudicated in the context of Texas's claim, our claim, and counterclaims 1 and 4 by New Mexico if this case proceeds, if those counterclaims are allowed to proceed.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: So you have waived sovereignty for counterclaims 1 and 4?

MR. MACFARLANE: Those are not pled against us. They are pled against Texas. But they raise issues, Counterclaim Number 4 raises the operating agreement. And I think for purposes of determining whether the operating agreement is consistent with an apportionment, you know, we've said that we will be -if we're in this case, we will be bound by a decree
that the Court enters on those issues.
And so I think in a way -- you could look at this way, in a way New Mexico doesn't really need to assert its counterclaim against the United States. It can get at the whole question of whether the operation of the project is consistent with an apportionment, as the Court will come to define it, just simply through the litigation over Texas's complaint and the United States's complaint and the two counterclaims that New Mexico has pled against Texas which, as Mr. Somach, I think, correctly notes, more or less mirror the claims in Texas's complaint.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: And I guess that's the point $I$ was getting to earlier. Really the operating agreement, while it's obviously important to the case, it's not something $I$ really need to resolve, as I see it, because once we adjudicate the apportionment and then we adjudicate whether you're operating the system in accordance with that apportionment, that really answers the abrogating agreement question.

MR. MACFARLANE: I think it does, frankly. THE SPECIAL MASTER: If you're doing it because of the operating agreement, and you say you're doing it wrong, then the operating agreement has got to be changed.

MR. MACFARLANE: We would have -- if the apportionment is such that the operating agreement, as it is currently configured, is inconsistent with what the Court says New Mexico or Texas are apportioned below Elephant Butte Reservoir, then obviously the operating agreement will have to be reassessed and possibly revised or eliminated altogether.

I mean, it's a potential remedy if we get into settlement discussions or other discussions. It is based upon how the project operated as a factual matter in the 19 -- between 1938 and 1978. But conditions have changed, and so those are issues which I think will possibly come up during the major part of -- what $I$ would consider to be the core of relating to this litigation.

I do want to address the sovereign immunity issue very briefly unless Your Honor has more questions about that.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Okay.
MR. MACFARLANE: It seems to me that
there's -- first of all, there's no dispute that New Mexico did not plead a waiver of sovereign immunity here. Instead, New Mexico is arguing that the U.S.'s participation in this action or intervention impliedly waived its immunity to counterclaims, and that by
merely intervening in this action we opened ourselves up to New Mexico's counterclaim.

There's no authority to support that proposition. And it's hard to see why New Mexico hasn't found any authority. The best it can come up with is Nebraska v. Wyoming, a 1995 Supreme Court decision, but that decision did not address questions of sovereign immunity.

The U.S. did not raise it. Again, I have no idea why we didn't, but we didn't. The United States, however, was already bound by the terms of the decree that the Supreme Court had entered in the Nebraska v. Wyoming litigation in 1945.

That decree, which decree -- which was an equitable apportionment degree of the actual flow of the North Platte River, included as a predicate to that decree, the government's operation of certain reservoirs.

So in 1994, when the case was reopened, Wyoming came back in and sought to assert a counterclaim, its fourth counterclaim, against the United States in connection with the operation of those reservoirs alleging that that was inconsistent with the predicate that the Court had addressed in its 1945 opinion and the decree.

In other words, the United States was bound by the earlier decree. The -- when Nebraska and Wyoming sought leave of the Court to amend their -- to amend counterclaims, and in the case of Nebraska, to assert a cross-claim in the case of Wyoming, it was working within the framework of the decree to which the United States was already bound, and we think that that is a distinguishing feature here.

In any event, the Court's silence on the question of sovereign immunity should not be taken as authority that when the U.S. intervenes in an original action, it waives immunity to counterclaims.

We've cited in our brief California $v$. Arizona for the proposition that claims against the United States should require a waiver even in an original action.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, what do you think you have waived your sovereign immunity to?

MR. MACFARLANE: Sorry, repeat that?
THE SPECIAL MASTER: What have you waived sovereign immunity to?

MR. MACFARLANE: Well, we haven't waived sovereign immunity to anything. We are participating in the case as a plaintiff. And when we intervened in this case and when we appeared before the Supreme Court
and argued that we should be allowed to proceed as a plaintiff, that -- that did not implicate questions of sovereign immunity because we were not subjecting ourselves to counterclaims coming back at us and, in fact, being sued or countersued by an opposing party, which would implicate that the United States had consented to that.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Are you making any argument that you would not be bound by a decree in this case?

MR. MACFARLANE: No, no, no. Quite the contrary. We are. We would be bound by a decree. And we acknowledge that. In fact, we expressly told the Court that we would be.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: So what difference does it make, as a practical matter, if all these issues get litigated between Texas and New Mexico as to operation of the project, who -- the proper allocation of water, whether or not the groundwater pumping is depriving Texas of their rightful share?

If all these issues get litigated and there's an ultimate decree, whether you're a counterclaim defendant or not, you're going to be bound by to that decree?

MR. MACFARLANE: That's correct, Your Honor.

But that then raises the question why are New Mexico's counterclaims against the United States raising all of these additional issues.

I agree with Mr. Somach, frankly, these counterclaims do potentially expand the issues that would be before Your Honor quite extensively. They've gone into not just the operating agreement, but the Water Supply Act, questions of project accounting, the Miscellaneous Purposes Act, questions related to channeling this on the -- of the Rio Grande and questions regarding the implementation of the 1906 convention with Mexico.

As far as we're concerned, these issues have nothing to do with what New Mexico and Texas are apportioned under the compact. That needs to be decided, and then we can address questions of whether the operating agreement or other project operations are consistent with that apportionment.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, you keep saying the only thing this case involves is what's the apportionment. As $I$ understand Texas is saying, we want to know what the apportionment is, but we also want to know if New Mexico is violating that apportionment, and if they are, we may be asking for money damages and we may be asking for water credit, we
may be asking for all kinds of relief. So, I mean, it's more than just apportionment.

MR. MACFARLANE: I understand that, Your
Honor, and this is one point --
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Let me just follow that up real quick. You say, well, accounting has nothing to do with this. Isn't this all about accounting?

MR. MACFARLANE: Your Honor, it's important to go back and look at New Mexico's counterclaims against the United States as New Mexico actually pled.

New Mexico is positing an obligation under the compact to engage in an accounting, which you will search the compact high and low, and you will not find language that imposes such a duty.

This is one of our -- it's like a theme that runs through our objections to New Mexico's counterclaims. They're positing duties that do not exist or have not been established with regard to the compact. And therefore --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, whether there's a counterclaim or not, aren't we going to get into accounting? I mean, isn't that one of bottom line issues in this case is we need to account for the water?

MR. MACFARLANE: That is correct. Whether

New Mexico's --
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, we can strike the counterclaim, but we're still going to be into accounting, right?

MR. MACFARLANE: I don't disagree with that.
It seems to me you should strike the counterclaim, but these are issues which will get litigated in the course of the case.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: So we're talking semantics.

MR. MACFARLANE: Well, I think they're more than semantics because, you know, to the extent that New Mexico is asserting counterclaims that go off in these various directions -- I mean, for the life of me, I don't understand what the miscellaneous purposes -or how New Mexico can establish that -- the United States is compliant with the Miscellaneous Purposes Act.

The issuance of a contract with El Paso violates the compact. But that's what they allege. And so, you know, I don't see that as an issue that is central. If New Mexico -- if the Court ultimately concludes that New Mexico's apportionment is such that those contracts are problematic, then we -- those can be addressed at that time.

I want to just underscore that the principle -- and I know Your Honor is familiar with this because back when you were a district judge and decided a case, you held that counterclaims against the United States require a waiver of sovereign immunity, this was a tax case, United States v. Engels, but I want to underscore that the principle has been reaffirmed by Court of Appeals, by the Supreme Court itself in Shaw.

New Mexico doesn't really address this case law. We believe it is controlling here and Your Honor should dismiss New Mexico's counterclaims against the United States on that basis alone.

Now, I can turn to the question of injury and standing. It really -- it really arises in connection with the fact that what New Mexico has as an apportionment under the compact below Elephant Butte Reservoir remains undefined.

I know that New Mexico thinks it's entitled to something like 57 percent, although they backed away from that in their reply brief, they qualified that to some degree. But the key here to our standing argument is that the -- New Mexico has not established a nexus between what it -- between specific project operations which it complains of, and what it's entitled to under
the compact.
It pleads interest over the compact in the most generalized, vague ways, you know, we have an interest in the compact, without saying anything more than about that interest consists of.

We would argue that New Mexico rest its standing against the United States on two bases. The first is its status as Parens patriae. But it's pretty well established that that is not a basis alone to obtain standing to assert a claim against the United States.

It works when -- if New Mexico is suing a state or asserting counterclaims against a state, it can be a basis for standing. But under Massachusetts V. Mellon and the Alfred L. Snapp case, it's not a basis for standing against the United States.

And then to the extent that New Mexico is claiming a sovereign interest in the compact as the basis for its standing, it has not articulated, as I said, a nexus between its compact apportionment and the specific violations it's alleging that the United States is engaged in.

So the cases that New Mexico particularly relies on to establish its allegations of injury are, in fact, equitable apportionment -- involve equitable
apportionment decrees where the decrees specifically or fairly concretely define what each state was entitled to.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Let me ask you this: Why has the Special Master not already decided this issue? Specifically in the context of the motion to intervene by Elephant Butte, one of the problems that the Special Master used to recommend denial of that motion was that New Mexico can adequately represent Elephant Butte's interest and specifically says compact -- the 1938 -- let me go back.

It says compact enforcement actions such as this one means that the signatory state to the compact are proper plaintiffs. And it goes specifically on to say that pursuant to parens patriae and Supreme Court precedent, New Mexico, as a proper party in interest to this original action, is presumed to represent the interests of the Elephant Butte Irrigation District.

MR. MACFARLANE: That may be true with regard
to Texas, but we don't believe that those statements were intended to apply to the United States' involvement.

And at that point, remember, the Special
Master, in his report, recommended that the United
States not be allowed to assert a compact claim. So
our position is the Special Master's recommendation had been accepted by the Supreme Court.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: You disagree -- you agree with that statement?

MR. MACFARLANE: Well, I disagree with that statement as it applies to the United States. I mean, New Mexico can represent its citizens in the parens patriae capacity, but that cannot be the sole basis of its standing if it's going to assert counterclaims against the federal government.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Let me ask you this: In the district court action in which New Mexico sued the United States and the two water districts, I don't know who the other defendants were, over the operating district, was standing raised as a defense?

MR. MACFARLANE: I believe it was.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Was it ever adjudicated?
MR. MACFARLANE: It was not.
So I don't want to take up too much more of
Your Honor's time, and perhaps moving on to the failure to state a claim issue. Unless Your Honor has more questions regarding standing and injury, I think I've pretty much covered what $I$ wanted to say about that.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Just to be clear, I want to complete the circle. You don't dispute New Mexico
has standing to argue apportionment?
MR. MACFARLANE: I think -- I --
THE SPECIAL MASTER: That how the water is to be apportioned is something New Mexico has standing to argue.

MR. MACFARLANE: Yes, I don't think we can dispute that.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: And they would not have any -- there would not be any question about their standing to assert violations of the compact, would there?

MR. MACFARLANE: I don't believe so.
Although, you know, whether you can assert a violation of a compact $I$ think depends upon knowing what your rights are under that compact, and that's --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I mean, that's exactly what Texas has done. They're asserting a violation of the compact, aren't they?

MR. MACFARLANE: Well, they are.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Isn't that what this whole case is about?

MR. MACFARLANE: I think that is what this case is about. But the issue here is -- and we're only raising the standing issue with regard to New Mexico's counterclaims against the United States. And we're
saying that, you know, where New Mexico claims it has an interest under the compact that some particular project action is interfering with or impairing, New Mexico has not sufficiently established a nexus between that compact interest and the alleged actions of which it complains on the part of the United States.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, but at the end of the day, without oversimplifying, this is a very high-level breach of contract case, isn't it? I mean, that's what we're -- I mean, that's what we're really talking about is Texas says, "New Mexico, we believe the contract means $X$, and you're violating it." New Mexico says, "No. The contract means $Y$, and not only are we not violating, you're violating it, Texas."

MR. MACFARLANE: And the United States is in the middle because we're the ones who deliver the water.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: And the United States is the agent for everybody.

MR. MACFARLANE: Right.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: And you're violating your agency agreement.

MR. MACFARLANE: Well, that's one way of looking at it.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: You may regret that
language by suggesting choices before.
MR. MACFARLANE: I noticed where it came from
too.
So we've also argued that New Mexico's counterclaims -- that most of the New Mexico's counterclaims against United States fail to state claims under a Rule $12(\mathrm{~b})(6)$ standard. I want to touch on three points in that connection.

First, New Mexico's counterclaims against the United States really do expand the scope of the litigation. I agree with Mr. Somach on that point. They issue -- they raised issues of compact -- of project operations that were never briefed to the Supreme Court when leave was granted for the filing of the United States' or Texas's complaint.

Secondly, we think the counterclaims against the United States as pled by New Mexico are full of vague and conclusory allegations and really don't meet the Iqbal standard. And I think the clearest evidence for this is New Mexico's response brief in which New Mexico tries to explain what it meant by what it pled.

If, you know, New Mexico believed that there was specific statutory obligations or duties, it was obligated in its counterclaim itself to cite them instead of just general -- you know, making very broad,
conclusory allegations that such a duty existed.
And third, New Mexico appears to argue that the compact's incorporation under the project in the downstream contracts imposes constraints on or overrides revisions of reclamation law by which the project has long operated.

And, again, New Mexico, it's hard to tease that out of the counterclaims it's pled because this is something, again, that New Mexico has tried to explain or expand upon in its response brief.

We've cited in our reply, Your Honor, that quite a few cases that stand for the proposition that a party cannot amend a pleading in an opposition brief to a motion to dismiss. If New Mexico wanted to amend its counterclaims, it should have sought leave to do so. It did not, although there's a part of it, just toward the end of its -- its response brief where it raises that as an alternative solution, if you will, to some of the issues that its counterclaims appear to address.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Let me ask you this:
The reclamation statutes predate the compact, right?
MR. MACFARLANE: That is correct.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: And, presumably, if you read the Supreme Court decision, what the Supreme Court was saying is that there were these -- all these other
agreements and other laws in place that were sort of incorporated into the compact. I'm oversimplifying it, but that's sort of what you're saying.

So unless there was an explicit rejection of reclamation law in the compact, that -- I think what you're saying, or this is the way I'm seeing it, is that then the reclamation gets incorporated into the compact. Would that be fair?

MR. MACFARLANE: I would maybe rephrase it slightly to say that the project was in existence before the compact was ratified. The project was delivering water, was making releases from storage and delivering that water to EBID, EP No. 1, and also to New Mexico. It was doing so pursuant to provisions of reclamation law.

The Miscellaneous Purposes Act, for example, is one such provision of reclamation law that specifically authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to enter into contracts with -- for the municipal use of water from the irrigation project with the consent of the water district in question.

So this is just one example of the panoply of reclamation law that -- under which the project was operating. It's our view, and I think this is consistent with Justice Gorsuch's opinion, it's our
view that the expectations of the -- of New Mexico and Texas when they signed the compact, was that that -- those operations under reclamation law would continue.

And it was out of the those operations that Texas would receive its apportionment and that New Mexico would receive a portion of some of its apportionment within the compact.

In fact, once New Mexico delivers water to the Elephant Butte Reservoir, the project takes over. And I think the compact is quite express about that.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I think one of the issues that $I$ think is going to have to be resolved in this case seems to be whether or not anything was frozen as of 1938, and would that include -- I don't know if there have been any substantive changes to the reclamation law since 1938, and if there are, do we use the 1938 law or do we --

MR. MACFARLANE: Well, reclamation law is fairly frequently amended, and so it is -- you know, it's constantly evolving. I think the critical -- I think really the answer to that question, and let me just say, we don't -- and this is, again, where we may be parting a little company with Texas, we don't -- we're not seeking injunctive relief based upon
the 1938 condition. Our position, as far as remedies is concerned, is informed by the Hinderlider decision of the Supreme Court.

We want New Mexico to administer its state
law in a way that protects the project and is
consistent with the text of the compact and what New Mexico agreed to. That's our position.

If it turns out, as we've discussed, Your
Honor, that their -- the apportionment decree that ultimately comes out of this litigation suggests that there may be provisions of reclamation law which are no longer consistent with the decree, then we'll have to deal with that at that time.

I want to touch on one last issue, and that is to circle back to the law of the case issue, because we did opine upon that somewhat. And as we see it, the law of the case in question boils down to what Your Honor should do with the first interim report and recommendation of Special Master Grimsal.

Whether you consider this as a classic law of the case, application of the law of the case documents or principles, or whether the underlying principles behind it, and this discussion comes from Arizona $v$. California, which we've cited in our brief, that courts will accord a degree of finality and repose to
decisions that are made along the line of the course of litigation.

We think that Your Honor should treat the compact issues that were addressed, and the compact interpretation issues that were addressed in the first interim report recommendation, as subject -- as worthy of a degree of finality, at least with regard to the litigation as it proceeds from here.

Now, ultimately the Supreme Court will have the final say about that, and then the court can overrule, the Court can modify, and the -- you know, there's no question that it -- that that's certainly within the Court's purview.

But the first Special Master's interpretation of the compact addressed questions of law and compact interpretation that arose from issues that New Mexico put in the file.

New Mexico interjected issues into the case of compact interpretation in its motion to dismiss, and as Mr. Somach has traced out, the -- how that was dealt with, the Court, when it denied or overruled New Mexico's exceptions -- and New Mexico's exceptions were not to the recommendation that its motion to dismiss be denied. New Mexico conceded that.

New Mexico's exceptions were focused on the
reasoning in the first Special Master's report, his compact interpretation based upon issues that New Mexico had raised in its motion to dismiss. When the Court overruled New Mexico's exceptions, it did not overrule that report. It let it stand.

So the report is there. It's not a nothing.
And I think it's -- given the attention the first Special Master devoted to questions of compact interpretation -- as Your Honor points out, you know, this is a high-level contract dispute. He applied contract principles in interpreting the compact, that that is worthy of some degree of respect and finality as -- at least for purposes of moving this case forward and structuring the issues that naturally have to be litigated. If Your Honor -- does Your Honor have other questions?

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Not right now, but I may have when you come back. So we'll -- we've been going for about an hour and a half. Let's take about a 10or 15-minute break.

MR. MACFARLANE: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: We'll come back and hear from New Mexico.
(Recess taken from 10:32 a.m. to 10:45 a.m.)
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Please be seated. I
think you're up, Mr. Roman.
MR. ROMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. David Roman on behalf of the State of New Mexico.

You know, sitting here listening this morning to some of these arguments, you could be forgiven for wondering if we're all even arguing the same case.

I think you could also be forgiven for wondering is this the same case as we were before you in August for the status conference, because we've seen arguments shifting radically even throughout the course of just the briefing on this one set of motions, let alone the way that these arguments have changed since the beginning of this case.

The U.S. has said over and over in its briefing that the apportionment is 57/43 and that it is carried out through the allocation of the project. And then now they're saying, and I know that they said we never said that it was -- that it was not an apportionment to New Mexico below Elephant Butte.

I think if you look closely at the briefing, they did in their response brief, and then in their reply brief they certainly pulled back on that and said, okay, there is some apportionment, but we don't know yet what it is, despite having argued for many rounds of briefing that we know exactly what it is and
here's what it is.
So we're seeing positions that are being taken that are not only contrary to prior positions taken earlier in this litigation, but that are also directly contrary to the words of the Supreme Court's March ruling and Justice Gorsuch's opinion.

We're being accused in a briefing of ignoring the consequences of the Supreme Court's ruling or our prior, what they call, concessions on the applicability of the compact below Elephant Butte.

Yet we're the only ones, as you've seen in the list of principles that we've submitted as part of the law of the case, that are tracking what the court actually said as opposed to you can glean this principle from what the first Special Master's report said or that principle, even though those were not before the Supreme Court as far as when they were making the ruling.

But as complex as this case is in some ways, and I like the way you put it is it's basically a very high-level contract dispute, as complex as it is in some ways, there's one part that is pretty simple in that Texas and the U.S. can't have it both ways.

Either an alleged interference with receiving the project allocation is a compact violation, in which
case changes to project operations that affect New Mexico's project allocation are also compact violations, or else you have a complete separation between project allocations and compact apportionment, which is what they're arguing now. But if that's the case, we wouldn't be before you on a compact case. So it can't be that Texas receiving its compact apportionment through the project and any shortage that way is a compact case but us not receiving ours is not a compact case. It just doesn't work that way.

And Texas and the U.S. are now essentially taking the position that while New Mexico has the responsibility to ensure that Texas receive its project allocation pursuant to the compact, we have no right to protect our compact apportionment through suing to bring to light actions going on in Texas or outside of New Mexico's control that affect the amount of our allocation and therefore our compact apportionment.

The U.S. just now is saying -- and taking a step back, saying, well, okay, we don't know what the apportionment actually is; therefore, New Mexico doesn't have yet standing to sue because they can't show an injury because there's not a -- we don't know what the apportionment is.

Well, if that's the case, they're trying to -- the U.S. and Texas are both trying to hold us liable for violating an unknown standard at the same time that we can't assert a violation of that same unknown standard.

Again, it doesn't make sense that all we're seeking is that the two sides can make the same argument. I think you hit it on the head when you said, we need to decide if, in fact, the apportionment is not 57/43, and I think that the Supreme Court essentially said that it is, and $I$ don't think we should go back and relitigate that. But if we do have to go and litigate what the apportionment is, then it becomes very, very relevant what actions are going on in terms of project operation that affect the amount of water that is going to both sides.

Is Texas being shorted its apportionment due to the actions of New Mexico? Is New Mexico being shorted part of its apportionment either due to the actions of Texas or due to the manner in which the operating agreement has reallocated apportionment or due to other events that are outside of our control?

One of the --
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Do you acknowledge -- is
it your position it is 57/43?

MR. ROMAN: That is our position, yes, Your Honor.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: How can Texas affect your allocation since it's downstream?

MR. ROMAN: That's a very good question. I know that they've tried to focus throughout on the fact we think only what's going on in New Mexico matters, but the fact is that this project is operated as a whole unit, and there are several ways in which it can be affected even though it's happening in a downstream state.

One is through very, very significant groundwater pumping just across the border in the Texas region which has the same alleged hydrological effect on reducing surface flows and capturing return flows that would otherwise either be able to be used in New Mexico or would flow to Texas.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Now, is this groundwater pumping -- and I don't want to read too much into the weeds and facts at this point, but is this groundwater pumping by the El Paso Irrigation District or is it by third parties that therefore is shorting El Paso its share?

MR. ROMAN: It's primarily by the irrigation district, not by the -- it's by the utility, which is
separate from the irrigation district.
And, Your Honor, I think at this point you're right, we don't necessarily need to get into the facts of what the actual effect is because we are at the 12(b) (6) stage, essentially, and whether we can raise a claim on this.

But it's not simply pumping that matters. We heard over and over again talk about how we're trying to expand the litigation greatly by bringing in these ideas of Miscellaneous Purposes Act contracts or municipal water between the City of El Paso, EP No. 1 and the United States, or that we're expanding the litigation by talking about the potential violation of the Water Supply Act through the incorporation of individual carryover storage accounts that have been put into place in the operating agreement for the first time that have no basis in the compact, have no basis in where the project has been operating.

I want to make very clear those claims really aren't about trying to invalidate those contracts or anything like that. It's about having the effect on the project recognized. Because right now inefficiencies in project delivery, whether they're caused by the actions of New Mexico, the actions going on in Texas, even pumping by Mexico, are all being
charged under the current operating agreement against Mexico.

And the reason I say that is because you've probably heard discussion about a DT curve, which is basically a way of saying for a given amount of project releases, how much -- how can we allocate the water such that deliveries to each state are going to be along the historical basis, which is, again, how can we make it so that we're supposed to be allocating it at 57/43 because it's incurred, the amount of water that is released is different from the amount that's delivered to the project because of that multiplier that comes from return flows.

So right now we have a situation in the operating agreement where deviations from that historic curve are all assessed against New Mexico as if they are solely responsible for any changes in project efficiency. Even if those deviations are caused in part by, as I say, inefficient river conveyances because of a lack of maintenance or these contracts that we talk about for municipal water.

El Paso said in their amicus brief they get approximately 50 percent of municipal supply through Rio Grande project water, water that was initially set aside for irrigation projects, they're getting pretty
much half of their supply, their municipal supply, sometimes up to 70,000 acre-feet a year from project supply.

> If you're changing the use of water from
irrigation to municipal use, you're going to necessarily have a change in the amount of return flows. If you're using it for irrigation, you're going to have more water flow back into the system after the irrigation which will continue flowing down throughout the district and replenish supplies that way.

If you're going to be using it for municipal purposes, that's going to change the way that the flows -- that you're going to have much fewer return flows, which in turn causes you to call for more water in order to be able to make the same type of deliveries.

And so the reason we bring up issues like that is not to invalidate those contracts. We don't want to see the municipal water supply threatened. But we also don't want to have to pay the price in New Mexico for short -- for systemic inefficiencies caused by a change in type of use.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: That gets back to my question though. I can understand how you're arguing that there could be groundwater pumping right out of
the water that could impact New Mexico, but how does the fact that New Mexico water district sells its water to El Paso, how does that affect you?

I mean, as long -- if they're getting their
water -- if whatever water they're getting, they're not
using appropriately under your theory, how does that affect you?

MR. ROMAN: And I'm glad you're asking for clarification because it's a very, very important point here. If we weren't being either sued for alleged underdelivery, or if the way that the operating agreement right now is trying to, again, charge New Mexico for any deviations from its historic curve which are allegedly caused by systemic inefficiencies, then maybe we wouldn't have a problem.

It's not that we're getting less water, it's that we are having to -- well, it is that we're getting less water. Because the way that the diversion ratio under the new operating agreement changes is, again, it charges us for any deviations, even those deviations that are caused by differences in systemic efficiency caused in Texas or, again, caused by pumping in Mexico.

You say, how can pumping in Mexico affect us?
Well, it affects us because we're essentially paying the price for pumping in Mexico. It's not being shared
equally among the states or even in the same ratio as we should be putting this water out there, and so --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: How can you
realistically say that asking me to intervene in the treaty negotiations between Mexico and the United States is not a huge expansion of this litigation? I mean, that, to me, is like -- that's pretty out there --

MR. ROMAN: No question about that, Your Honor.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: -- in terms -- and I don't think the Supreme Court would approve of that type of expansion.

MR. ROMAN: I agree. And that's why these are not claims to seek Your Honor to try to intervene in that. This is, I agree, if we have a justiciability issue here, this is a political question.

It's not a matter of trying to fix the problem, if you will, of Mexico pumping. It's a matter of saying, we need to figure out, based on this apportionment, how much is Texas supposed to be getting. If they're not getting what they are supposed to be getting, how much of it is due to actions going on in New Mexico versus actions elsewhere that are causing them to get less water.

All we're saying is you need to look at the system operating as a whole across the border in both states to understand what impact New Mexico groundwater pumping is having versus all of these other issues that do affect the systemic efficiency, and just don't charge us for all of them.

It's essentially more of a defense than it is an attempt to, as I say, fix things. The same way with those municipal contracts. Again, we're not trying to --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Why do you need to do it as a counter -- I mean, Mr. Somach calls it a -- I think he used the word closed-loop system. And if -- I can understand their argument that if Texas isn't getting what it is suppose to get, well, maybe New Mexico -- maybe because of global warming, the average -- there is double the rate of evaporation, I don't know, but --

MR. ROMAN: Sure.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: There may be other reasons other than what New Mexico is doing. And I understand that argument that -- or that maybe that Mexico somehow is taking all the water. But why do you need a counterclaim on that? That's not really Texas's fault. It's not really the United States' fault. Now,
it may be the way the United States administers the project. That could be an issue.

MR. ROMAN: Right. And it's not Texas's
fault, but at the same time, if they are getting more water than they are otherwise entitled to because -either calling --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Why isn't that just a defense for the lawsuit? I mean, Texas says we're getting less; you say no, you're not, here's the data, and isn't that the end of your case then?

MR. ROMAN: And Your Honor, in large part it is. Not the end of the case, but as far as we can -THE SPECIAL MASTER: I mean, if Texas is getting all the water it's entitled to under the compact, isn't that the end of the case?

MR. ROMAN: If Texas is getting everything they are entitled to under the compact, we would still want to make sure that New Mexico hasn't been getting less than it was entitled to under the compact.

But if it came out that we're getting what we've been entitled to historically and they have as well, sure, that's the end of case. Of course, we're still going to have to figure out going forward how to make that happen. But as far as past damages, as long as both sides were whole, then sure, that's the end of
the case.
We could have filed one overarching counterclaim the same way other states have done in similar compact enforcement cases that basically just said, we're meeting -- we're meeting our compact obligations but other actions are interfering with our compact apportionment and then laid them out, rather than specific comment on them, simply as subparts of explaining why we were being shorted or having too much taken from us as a result.

It probably makes sense to think of it in that way rather than truly expanding the scope of the litigation. Because if we can quantify the effect of some of these other issues we brought up, then that's what's important, the quantification of it, not the actual practical impact of going after those various claims.

Because, as you've touched on, Your Honor, this morning, because the Court has ruled that the project is incorporated within the compact and the compact apportionment is basically carried out through the downstream contracts with the U.S. as an agent, that's exactly why we've said that if the operating agreement affects that apportionment, which it does, it becomes a compact issue. It's not expanding the
litigation to point out that this affects the amount of the apportionment that we get.

The U.S. at least -- we have the monolithic U.S., and I know there's multiple different agencies, but the Bureau of Reclamation's final environmental impact statement on the 2008 operating agreement and whether it should continue or not was very clear that it significantly reduces New Mexico's 57 percent of project supply and therefore necessarily results in a corresponding increase to Texas.

It actually understated the final effect as to what it's been so far, but it certainly recognized the fact that there was a substantial effect on New Mexico's apportionment based on the implementation of the operating agreement.

But I want to make clear that by going -- trying to say that the operating agreement is invalid because it changes New Mexico's compact apportionment without New Mexico's participation in it, it's essentially a unilateral change in apportionment by the U.S. with the two districts.

And you can call it self-help if you want to, you can say the intent was to try to account for the effect of groundwater pumping in New Mexico, but it nonetheless can't be done without a compact in states
being part of it because of the change in compact apportionment.

But I want to be very clear about it, because I think there's been some confusion, I'm not saying that the concept of an operating agreement, somewhat along the lines of what's currently in place, would be invalid provided that it doesn't unfairly charge New Mexico for project inefficiencies that are out of its control, and that it recognizes the loss of project efficiency caused by actions in Texas or other actors that are outside of the United States' control, and that it's ratified by the compacting states. We're not trying to blow up this operating agreement and have a void.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: That's what I thought -that's exactly what you're doing. You filed a lawsuit to blow it up.

MR. ROMAN: I'm sorry?
THE SPECIAL MASTER: I thought that's exactly what you were doing. I thought you filed a lawsuit and said it was gone right now. I mean, if you could live with the operating agreement, as I understand it, we wouldn't have this litigation.

MR. ROMAN: Just because it's invalid as a matter of law because it was adopted without the
states' agreement to it doesn't mean that the concept of it itself is something that we couldn't work with. Again, $I$ want to be specific. There would
have to be changes to it that removed the inequities that we see in it, and it would have to be something that was put together with the states' involvement, because it is a compact issue.

Even if we were a hundred percent okay with it, it would still, in our view, be invalid as a matter of law because it requires ratification because it changes the compact apportionment.

But I don't want to leave the impression that we're seeking to have some sort of vacuum to be filled and no way to operate the project. We just want to make sure that if it's going to be operated pursuant to an agreement like this, that it is actually getting the two states what they are entitled to under the compact apportionment and not what's happening, in our view, which is giving Texas too much.

But in no way are we saying that the effects on project efficiency of the groundwater pumping in New Mexico are not something that can be -- that are validly recognized as part of an agreement like this.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: So you're not disputing anymore that you can't -- you can't take so much water
out of the ground while reducing the flow from Texas? MR. ROMAN: I take issue with one word that you used, Your Honor, respectfully, and that's
"anymore." There's been a lot of misconception, I think, about what the arguments were on the motion to dismiss, and that's part of why it's important to focus on those arguments in understanding what was actually decided in denying the motion to dismiss.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, part of the problem is, both what was decided but also what you argued. And, I mean, you can't run away from the motion to dismiss.

MR. ROMAN: Correct. No, I know we can't.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: And you made the arguments, and they were rejected, and so you're kind of stuck with that.

MR. ROMAN: And we are not trying to run away from the motion to dismiss, or at least the --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, you won't. Well, it sounds like you are getting to a point, go ahead.

MR. ROMAN: The reason $I$ say that is because I view the motion to dismiss as really more of a kind of choice of law issue: Does the state law and reclamation law apply below Elephant Butte or does the compact apply below the Elephant Butte?

In making our motion to dismiss, it was never the intent to say New Mexico can intercept project water after it leaves Elephant Butte as much as it wants or that we don't have to let the water flow to Texas.

It was more a matter of, there are state administrative -- there's a state administrative framework in here to deal with this. Does that state administrative framework apply or, instead, is this a compact issue? Because, frankly, until the Supreme Court's decision in this case, the case law had -- it was sparse, but it universally held that there is not -- that the compact does not apply below Elephant Butte.

So we raised that issue as a defense, it was rejected, and we gave up and we moved on and we didn't even take an exception to that part of the argument.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, I mean, maybe you disagree with Special Master Grimsal, but as I read his report, that's exactly what he thought you were saying.

MR. ROMAN: It is what he thought we were saying.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: And you say in your
motion to dismiss that the project -- the project and the compact have no impact upon groundwater. You can
pump groundwater to your heart's content. I mean, I think that's what you said.

MR. ROMAN: I think -- I think what was said was potentially inartfully said, but I can tell you that the intention was not to suggest that unlimited groundwater pumping of hydrologically connected groundwater to a river that affects system efficiency does not need to be accounted for.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: But you also say you have no duty to protect the water.

MR. ROMAN: Under the compact. Under the compact. Because we took the position, consistent with prior court rulings, that the compact itself did not apply below Elephant Butte. But it would be far too wide of a --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: How could the compact not apply below Elephant Butte?

MR. ROMAN: Because --
THE SPECIAL MASTER: I mean, if you've got a compact that says Texas was supposed to get 43 percent of the water, and you say it doesn't apply below the compact, you have no restrictions on groundwater pumping, and you don't have to protect Texas's rights, then what's the compact -- then the compact might as well be -- you know, it's a worthless piece of paper.

MR. ROMAN: Your Honor, first of all, until the Court's decision that the project and the downstream contracts were incorporated in the compact as the means of distributing the compact apportionment, that had not been held before and --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: But your position was, as I understand it, in the motion to dismiss, was that you had no obligation to protect Texas. Let's assume it's 43 percent, 43 percent of the project water, you've got no restrictions on your groundwater pumping, and that the compact does not apply below the Elephant Butte Reservoir, and that therefore if you take all of the water in the groundwater pumping, there's nothing to prevent you from doing that.

MR. ROMAN: Respectfully, Your Honor, that was not what we said. It truly has to do with is there a compact obligation to protect the water versus a reclamation law obligation to protect the water.

I don't think that we were running away from the reclamation law obligation. And with that said, there are remedies --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: You said no federal law applies. I thought that was your position, that it's only New Mexico law, and New Mexico law imposes no obligation upon you to do anything basically.

MR. ROMAN: So under Section 8 of the Reclamation Act, with a reclamation project state law governs the administrative framework of water law within the state. That's a far cry from saying there's no obligation to protect water to the project.

Instead it's saying if Texas is being shorted water, there is an administrative framework within New Mexico under the state law that it can take advantage of to say we're being shorted water. That is not saying we have no obligation; we can pump whatever. And, again, certain things may not have been said as artfully as they could have been, but it is not a change in position to say that pumping of hydrologically connected groundwater in New Mexico contributes to a loss of efficiency and therefore lower deliveries to Texas.

It's something that can absolutely -- that must be accounted for and that can be the basis for a suit. It's just a question is it a suit under New Mexico law or is it suit under the compact.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, I don't want to beat a dead horse, so let's just say is there any question today that New Mexico must administer its laws and administer its water allocation, if that's the right word, in such a way as to protect Texas's
allocation?
MR. ROMAN: None whatsoever, Your Honor. I would even go so far as to say under Hinderlider, the compact and the compact duties supersede whatever New Mexico law is.

I should say it a better way. New Mexico state law applies to the extent it is not inconsistent with the compact such that if -- and we've seen this in other cases too. You have parties who have specific contractual rights to certain amounts of water. If that interferes with compact apportionment -- and that was Hinderlider -- if that interferes with compact apportionment getting to the other state, it's the compact apportionment that supersedes even though it's prior contract rights that are brought under state law.

So we may disagree about whether that's a change in position, but it certainly -- whether or not it is, going forward that is -- absolutely, we're acknowledging that.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you.
MR. ROMAN: I'd like to turn real briefly to the sovereign immunity issue, if I could. The U.S. is contending that we can't bring a counterclaim against it in this case because it hasn't waived sovereign immunity. But once again, that really kind of flies in
the face of the positions that it's taken throughout the history of the case and also ignores one of the specific reasons the Supreme Court granted it leave to intervene as a compact plaintiff in this case.

Of course they've been given leave to
intervene either -- to pursue a claim under reclamation law by the Special Master. The Supreme Court said yes, you can participate in this case as a plaintiff stating a compact claim because the U.S. sought out the Court's jurisdiction here and intervened in this preexisting dispute not only to protect its own interests and to raise claims against New Mexico, but also, it said, to permit full resolution of all of the issues in this case.

Even in its argument before the Supreme Court it said, We are an indispensable party to allow a full resolution of the issues in this case. And now to say, But we can't be sued for deviating from our duties as an agent of the compact wouldn't permit full resolution of the issues in this case.

I looked at Florida v. Georgia, where the U.S. did not intervene in the case and assert its sovereign immunity, and the court found that we can't afford full relief to the -- both states to figure out this whole resolution because the U.S. isn't
participating in it. And that's a different situation since it chose not to intervene.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, I was
thinking -- I read Florida v. -- or Georgia v. Florida, and I think you cannot separate the fact that if you're a judge or, I presume, a Justice of the Supreme Court, they can't forget the argument they just heard an hour before Wednesday morning, and they were obviously very frustrated with the inability to effectuate the complete relief and the Corps of Engineers refusal to intervene in that case, and I'm sure that had to be in their mind when they were thinking about this case.

MR. ROMAN: Quite possibly. But once again, I want to make clear, we're not saying that anytime the U.S. intervenes in a compact case it automatically means that they're open to counterclaims absent a waiver, that there's some sort of implicit waiver simply by intervening in the case.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I think they
acknowledge, and certainly Mr. MacFarlane can correct me if I'm wrong, that they will be bound by any decree that's entered in this case and will be subject to that decree. But I don't know that you can sue them for damages, which is what you're trying to do.

MR. ROMAN: What we want is a recognition of
the past overdelivery to Texas as a result of the actions of the United States. And to me, that's a separate issue from monetary damages.

I don't think we're going to dispute that sovereign immunity has not been waived in monetary damages in this case. And $I$ think it's a separate issue, though, from whether they can be sued for a dereliction of duty, if you will, in the administration of the project that leads to a change in compact apportionment.

Mr. MacFarlane talked about Nebraska v. Wyoming and said it's not really applicable to this case, and yet that's one of the only other cases where you have a compact apportionment or, in this case, a decree that is carried out by means of a United States-run project, and they used the term that it's a necessary predicate in establishing the apportionment. Well, the U.S. cited this case and sought the right to intervene in this particular case on the basis that if a state can sue the United States under an interstate compact to which the U.S. is not a party for operating a project in a way that undermines an equitable apportionment, then the U.S. should be permitted to state a claim arising under the compact. THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, let's assume that
at the end of the day it's determined that Texas was getting shorted, as they say they are, and maybe even New Mexico is getting shorted, and it's all because of mismanagement by the United States on the project. Instead of delivering 60,000 acre-feet a year to New Mexico, they deliver 20,000 acre-feet a year. Would I have the authority to tell the United States you've got to manage this project differently?

MR. ROMAN: The U.S. has said that it would be bound by any decree that's entered, and presumably a decree that's entered that sets out the apportionment, whether it's what we believe it already is or that changes it somewhat, the U.S. would have to operate within the bounds of that decree because they are recognized as an agent of the compact that not only has rights but that does have specific duties as the Court has ruled. And --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: So I may be able to say you're violating those duties but now, United States, you've got to figure out how to come into compliance. I may not be able to tell them how to do it, but I can tell them they're doing it wrong right now?

MR. ROMAN: This shows exactly why it's so important to have the U.S. as a defendant, not simply a matter of, well, this issue is simply going to be
decided either way just through litigation against Texas, and you can use as a defense that we aren't operating the project correctly, but you can't sue us for operating it incorrectly.

And I think there's a difference between saying you're not doing it right, you need to figure out how to do it, and saying you are actually held to this standard of being able to meet this apportionment.

As a defendant, they would be in a position of having what their actual duties and rights are fully adjudicated as opposed to being almost a bystander despite the fact that they have this very central role as recognized by the Court in making these apportionments recognized.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: What's your argument about your right to attack, the standing to attack the operating agreement?

MR. ROMAN: Standing to attack the operating agreement is based on the fact, as I said before, that if the apportionment between the states is carried out through the downstream contracts which require allocation of the water in a $57 / 43$ split, which the Court has held it is inextricably intertwined, and that is the means by which the compact apportionment is carried out, that any project operation that
meaningfully changes that compact allocation is, by definition, a compact issue. If --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: But I guess the point is, and maybe it's a difference without a distinction, that if the federal government is operating the project pursuant to the operating agreement, and that results in a violation of the compact, almost ipso facto that means the operating agreement is invalid.

We don't really need to get to that point, do
we? Does it really make a difference why, if
it's -- if they're operating it incorrectly?
MR. ROMAN: I'm not sure I understand your question, Your Honor.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, if the federal government comes in and says -- or the evidence at the end of the case shows that you're not getting your fair share or you're not getting -- not your fair share, you're not getting your share you're entitled to under the compact, that's a violation, presumably, of the compact, right?

MR. ROMAN: Correct.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: And if the United States says, well, the reason for that is because we're doing it pursuant to this operating agreement, that almost, by necessity, means that the operating agreement has to
be changed or invalidated.
MR. ROMAN: Absolutely, that would follow, but part of --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I don't know if you need to attack the operating agreement directly.

MR. ROMAN: Well, part of problem is that by adopting an operating agreement that changes the compact apportionment unilaterally, we've set up a system here where states are having their apportionment changed without input.

It could just as easily go the other way. If the U.S. were to implement a different operating agreement that changed the ratio very much in New Mexico's favor and changed Texas's apportionment as a result of doing that, then Texas should certainly have the opportunity to say the adoption of this by itself, because of the effect of changing the apportionment, is something that you do not have the authority to do.

And part of what this case is about, you know, we -- anybody who's been involved in this case for a long time, I think would admit we probably wouldn't be here today, Your Honor, had there not been a lawsuit filed in the district court on the operating agreement.

So this idea that it's somehow extraneous or
adding to this litigation is -- not only doesn't make a whole lot of sense, but it's also belied by the position that at least the United States and Elephant Butte Irrigation District took in that district court case where Judge Browning, by the time that Texas filed its motion for leave to file in the Supreme Court, asked the parties: Should I stay this case? Are the issues the same or not?

The U.S. took the position that the case should be stayed because Texas's claims in the Supreme Court appear to directly relate to the claims New Mexico has raised in this district court action, which was largely about the operating agreement. It said the original action would join many of the same issues presented in New Mexico's First Amendment -- amended complaint, which went after the operating agreement, including the interpretation and enforcement of the compact.

Elephant Butte -- I mean EP No. 1 also took the position, in addressing the issues involved in Texas's proposed complaint. The Supreme Court will address all of the underlying issues of law and fact present in this case, the one about the operating agreement, including the Rio Grande project, the operating agreement, and the accounting and
administration of the project.
I think it was understood from an early stage that the operating agreement, and the way in which it changed the allocation of water, was going to be at the heart of this case and would have to be resolved as part of resolving any of Texas's complaints because, as you say, in the end it's a matter of who's apportioned what, is that being met or not.

But it's also a matter of what rights and responsibilities do actors other than the states have to effect compact apportionment. I think it's very important to deal with in this case because we also have to have a system that goes forward. And if there's the ability to change allocations unilaterally, we've got a real problem at that point.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, but I think the argument that, at least the United States makes, and I'm not sure if Texas is in total agreement with this, is that really you're a stranger to this issue once the water gets delivered to Elephant Butte because at that point the allegation -- allocation of -- the allotment is not to New Mexico, but it's to the Elephant Butte Irrigation District. And if they want to give away some of their water, that's their right to do.

And the problem I'm having a little trouble
getting my head around is then where does that give Texas standing to sue for Texas water, but that's another issue. But really, then, it's the two water districts that control the water, and if they want to enter into an agreement with the United States to say instead of 57/43 it's going to be 50/50, so what?

MR. ROMAN: And that, Your Honor, would certainly be the case if this was simply about project allocation and we had what $I$ was talking about at the very beginning of my argument, a distinction between what's allocated for the project and compact issues.

I think the Supreme Court has been very clear that the means by which the states get their compact apportionment is through project deliveries. So once you're changing the project allocation, you are, by definition, changing compact apportionment. And that's the part that can't be done unilaterally without the compacting states being part of it, but --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: But Justice Gorsuch also said the contracts are incorporated into the compact. MR. ROMAN: Right.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: So if the compact
allocating -- or apportions 57 percent to the Elephant Butte Irrigation District and they want to sell their water to Las Cruces for drinking water or they want to
give Texas a little more than 57 percent, what prohibits them from doing that?

MR. ROMAN: Because the compact apportionment
is to the state, not to Elephant Butte Irrigation District. That's the distinction between an allocation and an apportionment. If -- because they're not the only ones who are affected by how much of that water is delivered to the State of New Mexico.

The district is a creature of the state, it's created by state statute, and they would not have the authority to give away, in essence, compact apportioned water that is apportioned to the State of New Mexico.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Is that not -- is that one of key issues that $I$ have to decide in this case, whether they do, in fact, have that right?

Do they have the right to enter into a contract with municipalities, as El Paso has done with the suit -- El Paso water district has done with the City of El Paso, to allocate some of their water for municipal purposes? Could Elephant Butte enter into a contract with Las Cruces?

MR. ROMAN: Under the correct circumstances.
And, again, $I$ think what we're trying to say when we bring up those contracts that are entered into between EP No. 1 and the City of $E l$ Paso is not that under no
circumstances can these types of contracts ever be valid, it's a matter of the effect that those contracts are having on the project as a whole just has to be recognized and accounted for.

And so similarly, if those contracts were to be entered into under the correct circumstances following meeting all the correct requirements and there was an accounting for a reduction in efficiency, that's something that could happen.

I'd like to touch briefly --
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Go ahead.
MR. ROMAN: -- on this idea of what's been decided, what the impact is of the first report.

The Court was very, very clear in what it was deciding at the time that it issued its opinion. It made extremely clear it was deciding only whether the U.S. could intervene in this case as a compact plaintiff and stake a claim under the compact.

Texas said, well, the Special Master report was not rejected. That's absolutely correct. Texas asked it to be -- asked the Court to adopt it in full. The Court did not do that either.

I view -- basically it seems like Texas is trying to hold the -- first, the Court out as kind of almost in the nature of a district court decision that
is the law of the case until -- unless and until it's overturned by an appellate court.

And I think that isn't the way that it's
meant to -- it should be considered because the brief, as you well know, respectfully, Special Masters' reports are advisory in nature, and until the Court adopts them or makes a ruling based on the reasoning in the report, they are in an advisory capacity.

So I would actually analogize it to be something that's much more akin to report and recommendation issued by a federal magistrate judge to a district court judge. At the time that the report recommendation is given to the district court judge, the parties have the ability to file objections to that.

The district court judge can issue his or her own opinion, either taking into consideration what the report and recommendation has said, or parts of it, or none of it. It doesn't have to rule on all of the objections.

And once that actual operative decision has been issued, that is what is the law of the case going forward. And the report and recommendation doesn't take on a life of its own or doesn't govern the case. Yes, there are --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Do you agree, though, that for purposes of the law of the case, that what -- I think, and I can't remember which amicus it was, but one of the amicus that was supporting your general position, has indicated that everything the Supreme Court said beyond, "United States, you can intervene," should be ignored. Do you go that far?

MR. ROMAN: Everything -- I'm sorry, Your
Honor. Everything, you said?
THE SPECIAL MASTER: In other words, that is what the Supreme Court said in the opinion by the incorporation of the contracts and how -- I mean, they did more than just say, "Objection overruled. United States, you can intervene." They could have done that, I suppose, but they actually discussed how the compact works. That's all in the case, isn't it?

MR. ROMAN: I agree completely, and that is exactly why when we put forward our ten positions, we tried to track exactly what the Supreme Court said. You'll notice in the Supreme Court decision they did not quote the first report, they did not cite to the first report, they did not incorporate anything explicitly that was -- any of the reasoning of the first report, and they also did not formally adopt the first report, as certainly they know how to do, as they
have done in many other situations.
So I would not agree with the -- I believe it was actually a party who stated that everything else is basically dicta.

I think that they -- there are some very significant consequences to this case that were determined by that Supreme Court decision, but we need to focus on what those particular rulings were and not try to extrapolate from, well, maybe they took it from this part of the Special Master's report or maybe by not rejecting the Special Master's report, basically everything that was in there is now part of what the Supreme Court decided.

They did not look at the vast majority of these issues when they were issuing their opinion, but certainly everything that's in the opinion that we can distill in the principles is something that they should have done in this case and we take that position.

If you have no other questions --
THE SPECIAL MASTER: I think we'll bring that to a close and I'll -- I'm going to give the amici a chance to speak now for a few minutes if any of them want to, and then I'll allow Texas and New Mexico and United States -- oh, I'm sorry. I apologize. I forgot Colorado, the state we're sitting in.

Mr. Wallace?
MR. WALLACE: Thank you, Your Honor.
I suppose in this case it might be a privilege to be forgotten for large portions of it. Chad Wallace, I'm here representing the State of Colorado.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Sometimes as a litigation strategy, just kind of duck below the table and hope everyone forgets you.

MR. WALLACE: As long as it works.
Along those lines, along with the response raised that Colorado filed and the arguments today, I will keep it short and, more importantly, very narrowly focus on the issues.

Colorado has made a concerted effort to not weigh on the merits of the claims and defenses, counterclaims and deferring to the parties directly involved to try and resolve those.

However, as you mentioned in the August conference with Your Honor, issues especially of general compact juris prudence are raised, and Colorado may at least be adversely affected, we will reserve that right to speak up and raise those issues.

So then I've got three points that I would
like to raise in these comments, the first being that
the holding of the Supreme Court regarding the meaning of any compact are expressed within the Court's opinions. Rather a simple concept.

The second is if the United States intervenes as a plaintiff to bring a compact claim against a state, it's waiving sovereign immunity for compact counterclaims based on the same transaction occurrence.

Thirdly, the Supreme Court has itself not categorically excluded equitable defenses in an interstate compact dispute.

So as to the first issue, the Supreme Court's holdings on the Rio Grande compact are expressed in the Court's orders. Now, this topic deals just with what the Supreme Court itself has held with regard to the compact and the law of the case on that issue.

So this is not a -- this is a question solely of what has the Supreme Court itself done and not a question about whether any of the parties have correct legal interpretations about the compact itself.

It's a very narrow question. What is the opinion? There were a number of them. The main one the parties talked about is the March 5, 2018, opinion by Justice Gorsuch. That opinion expressly states it is addressing the single narrow issue of whether the United States may intervene during the compact claim
against a state using essentially the same claims as Texas has already asserted.

And in that regard, that is the only issue that Colorado believes the Court addressed in that opinion. And it was addressing a series of motions by New Mexico as to the nature of the motion to dismiss. In doing so, it accepted the allegations by the parties as true. And in part, that's where we get a number of descriptions, contextual descriptions in the case regarding the compact, treaties with Mexico, and upstream contracts. Those were providing context specifically for the interest of the federal government in this case and justifying its intervention in the compact claim.

These are the federal -- this is the basis of the complaint, it's what justifies the United States coming in, and it forms the backbone, and the Court laid out four factors for applying that allowed in this case, under these circumstances, the United States to advance its compact claim against New Mexico.

The Court laid out in a very simple manner the four different analyses that it actually made, the first being the project and compact are inextricably intertwined; and second, that New Mexico had made various concessions and briefed an argument about
indispensability of the United States, the United States' necessary status in carrying out portions of the compact; the third being treaty obligations owned by the United States to the Republic of Mexico in the 1906 convention; and the fourth is that claims brought by the United States essentially a year ago was already
in existence when it was brought by Texas.
So this is really all that this March 5th
opinion dealt with. Why the United States would come in, all the background allegations which were accepted as true, this supported that. This was the federal interest that justified this information.

This Court could beg the question of, well, what are Texas's claims under the compact, and the Special Master, arguably, spent -- quite a lengthy report, nearly 300 pages, exploring some of those issues: What did the compact do, what are the various obligations.

However, those issues were not addressed in the March 5th report. Indeed, the motion to dismiss Texas's complaint was not a subject at all in the March 5th opinion. In fact, it was in the October 10th opinion of 2017 the Court simply said there the motion to dismiss is denied without any other explanation.
So I think we're not left with the Court
giving us a lot of analysis, if any at all, about what these claims actually are about.

And one of the reasons Colorado wants to point this issue out is to not argue what the correct interpretation of the compact is, but to try and avoid a precedent interstate compact jurisprudence that allows the implication of Supreme Court opinions when no actual analysis is made of those opinions.

And some of the parties have already pointed out the interim report takes a number of factual issues under -- under Rule 12 procedures and it conducts its analysis on the compact itself. So the report has quite a bit in it; the Supreme Court opinions do not.

So what we're left with, the question of whether we try to imply from that report analysis that would not exist. And in this case, it may be difficult because not all of the opinions in the report were excepted to, so then the Supreme Court had no occasion to rule on them.

It might also create some uncertainty going forward if we try to imply analyses of the Supreme Court opinion that do not exist and creates uncertainty for the parties of what source of law meant.

> And we've had in this briefing already references to the Supreme Court orders, to Special

Master reports, and even to the Special Master memoranda that were not submitted as reports to the Supreme Court, and this, of course, creates a very confusing collection of analyses for the parties.

I simply hope that when we're talking about the Supreme Court opinion, we're able to stick to the expressed opinions of the Supreme Court and let the parties know that we're necessarily looking at the Supreme Court's expressed opinions.

So I would ask that the Special Master find on this issue that when discussing what the Supreme Court itself did in analyzing compact, that analysis would come through the express language of the Court's orders.

The second item I want to get to is the sovereign immunity. I know that Your Honor has asked a number of questions on that already, and $I$ know parties have talked about that.

Colorado's position is a relatively narrow one, and we're not asserting whether any of the counterclaims should continue, whether they had to be pled or any other factual support of.

Quite simply, Colorado is supporting the
legal principle that if the United States should
intervene in an interstate compact dispute to sue the
state under a compact, then it has waived the sovereign immunity for counterclaims based on that compact and arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. In fact, the United States, in making the successful arguments to intervene, stated it was subjecting itself to the Court's jurisdiction.

In its reply brief to the exceptions, it said
the United States has intervened and subjected itself to this Court's jurisdiction to permit a full resolution of the dispute among all the parties over the interpretation of the compact.

It's a fairly broad statement, and I think it still leaves a question about whether the counterclaims meet that standard and whether they're within the scope of where the case sat before the extra counterclaims were brought.

So in that regard, Special Master, we ask you to evaluate whether the counterclaims meet that standard by defining the scope of this dispute and not to issue a blanket ruling that the United States is subject to sovereign immunity for all purposes.

Colorado's third argument was regarding equitable affirmative defenses. Our position is that the Supreme Court has not definitively ruled that equitable defenses are not available in interstate
compact disputes.
And part of the reason is, while compacts are essentially contracts between states, the Supreme Court has recognized that its forum is essentially an equitable one, and that it can form the process and procedure of that -- of that dispute resolution however it sees fit. This, by definition, allows consideration of equitable defenses.

As Your Honor has pointed out, perhaps some things need further factual development before ruling in the abstract on whether these defenses should be allowed.

In a reading you pointed out a number of
instances in which the Supreme Court allowed consideration of those defenses. Arguably, none of the parties, at least in the case of Colorado's side, prevailed in utilizing those defenses, but I think it's important to point out that the Court allowed the parties to explore those defenses, to put on a case, and allowed the Special Master to determine, in the first instance, whether those parties asserting the defenses have met that.

So in unclean hands, this is another
situation in which we don't have a ruling from the Supreme Court itself but, rather, from the Special

Master, in Kansas $v$. Nebraska.
Nebraska had asserted an unclean hands defense against Kansas regarding the apportionment and use of the Republican River. And the Special Master in that case essentially determined that the unclean hands defense was nothing more than a mirror image of Nebraska's counterclaims against Kansas for overuse, and rather than proceed with that under the unclean hands defense, simply allowing all of the parties to fully explore what their allocations were and what the use might be would be the more useful way to proceed in that case.

That was issued in a memorandum rather than in a report to the court and was not accepted to, so the Supreme Court simply did not have a chance to rule on that issue. So there hasn't been a definitive ruling from the Court on the unclean hands defense.

Under defenses, acceptance, waiver, estoppel, Colorado pointed out two cases with which parties, albeit unsuccessfully, were still, nonetheless, allowed to present those cases on those issues.

One was New Jersey v. New York. It was an interesting compact case regarding the ownership of Ellis Island. The Court in that case allowed New York to proceed in the case with essentially an acquiescence
affirmative defense, and it ultimately found that New York's acquiescence defense was really a laches defense and it hadn't met its burden of proof.

Likewise, in Kansas v. Colorado, Colorado raised, I believe, an estoppel type of defense. It was allowed to present it. It did not meet its burden of proof at trial.

And thirdly, the laches defense. Although there's quite a bit of case law regarding the use of laches against sovereigns, including states, perhaps because of the unique equitable proceedings of original jurisdiction actions, the Supreme Court has not yet closed the door on the application of that defense.

It left it open again in Kansas v. Colorado.
The laches defense was not successfully used but was allowed. Again, it was a situation where the burden of proof was not met on that.

And likewise in New Jersey v. New York, the Supreme Court and Special Master allowed that defense to proceed. And I think it's rather prescient that there are a number of factual questions, in lieu of the types of remedies sought by the various parties, and perhaps that can better inform the Special Master as to whether these defenses will be useful and whether they can actually be met, and Colorado asks that the Court
not outright rule that such equitable defenses are not
available as a general matter of law in interstate compact, and instead case-by-case determination should be made depending on the situation at hand.

Unless Your Honor has questions, that's all
Colorado has in this matter.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you very much,
Mr. Wallace.
Let me start with the two irrigation
districts, Elephant Butte and El Paso Water
Improvement. Do either of you wish to be heard?
MS. BARNCASTLE: Thank you, Your Honor.
Samantha Barncastle for the Elephant Butte Irrigation District.

The New Mexico Enabling Act provides that there be an autoreserve to the United States, with full acquiescence by the state of all rights and powers for carrying out the provisions of the United States of the Reclamation Act, and acts amendatory thereof, supplementary thereto, to the same extent as if the State had remained a territory.

That's exceptionally important here because what that says is New Mexico long ago gave up its ability to interfere with the Rio Grande project.

Even beyond that, though, state law provides

EBID with the authority to deal in all project operations within New Mexico, statutes providing set forth "may enter into any obligation or contract with the United States for the construction, operation and maintenance of and necessary work for the delivery and distribution of water therefrom."

Unlike most other water users in New Mexico, this type of water use is not subject to the New Mexico water code. It is specifically exempted, the Rio Grande project is specifically exempted by New Mexico statute from state engineer authority. So that's really important because what New Mexico is arguing is that New Mexico has now an allocation or an -- let's see, an apportionment under the compact, which I'll get to, and we disagree with, but it's such that they would need to approve any contracts that change that apportionment.

What they're really saying is their compact commissioner, which is the state engineer, would have to weigh in on those contracts. That's contrary to state law. It's contrary to the Enabling Act. It's contrary to over a hundred years of how the project has operated.

Even more important, consider the example of the Elephant Butte Irrigation District under a
situation where the operating agreement is not in place, deciding not to make an allocation to its farmers in a given year. The EBID board has that authority, and New Mexico nor any of the farmers within the district could be heard to complain about that.

That's because of a case called Brantley Farms v. CID that's cited in my brief.

So essentially what that says is the EBID board is in control of the allocation, and if New Mexico has apportionment, which they don't, EBID's board would be in control of that.

Those are all examples of how the New Mexico legislature and the New Mexico courts have long recognized the autonomy of EBID and this reclamation project within New Mexico.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: You say they don't have a right to interfere, but do they also have an obligation not to let anybody else interfere?

MS. BARNCASTLE: Absolutely. That's been EBID's longstanding position. That's the issue in this case, Your Honor.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: It does seem to me though the real issue is are they allowing uncontrolled drilling of water that has the hydrological effect of reducing the flow of the Rio Grande?

MS. BARNCASTLE: All the way back to 1986
EBID filed the adjudication, the stream adjudication, in state court making that exact claim, the project is not being protected by all of this uncontrolled development.

Granted, most of our farmers are part of that development of groundwater. In fact, EBID has its own groundwater right, and throughout the history of the adjudication we have claimed through cases like Ide v. The U.S., the Templeton Doctrine under New Mexico law, that the Rio Grande project, that EBID has its own claim to a portion of water that -- we aren't calling it groundwater, but it's the flow of water that otherwise would appear in our drains to be delivered as surface water.

So that's the exact issue is that New Mexico has not applied its own state law to prevent an improper interference with the project. Where, you know, they're now claiming instead that it's the operating agreement that's the problem.

That's not the case. The operating agreement was meant to solve the interstate problem and make it an intrastate problem that we then resolved with the New Mexico administration that New Mexico has failed to administer altogether.

But the reason the authority has been provided to EBID makes sense for multiple reasons: First, EBID is an entity that's seceded an interest to the private water users association that was formed and that was comprised of the members that actually paid for this project.

The water and the situation that we have in Lower Rio Grande would not be what it is today had the farmers not invested in that project. They paid for this, they -- not the State of New Mexico, not public funds. The State does not supplement EBID's public -or EBID's budget in any way with public funds. It's a totally farmer-led system.

And the second and related issue is that the water that's part of this system was appropriated a long time ago, first under land grants before we were even the United States in that area. We got water appropriated under Mexican and Spanish land grants before we came into the U.S.

Once we came in, and the United States came into this area and started the Rio Grande project, those rights were rolled into the project, and the United States filed two notices with the territorial engineer saying all other water is hereby appropriated for our project and nobody else can touch it.

So all of that water has been taken out of the public domain a long time ago. Some of it was never even part of the public domain as far as what New Mexico had the authority to control.

The U.S. did that because they needed assurance that New Mexico would not interfere with its project and the water needed to help the farmers pay back the debt to the United States.

Upon paying off its construction obligations to the U.S., EBID received a quitclaim deed to the canals, laterals and drains that are at issue in this case. It's EBID, EBID's facilities that capture those drain flows and return flows that we then use to reallocate to deliver water to our own farmers, and then further downstream to EP No. 1.

EBID controls those rights and responsibilities under New Mexico law. And we haven't gotten there in the adjudication yet, but we will be going there. It's the whole reason the adjudication was filed by EBID.

Acting under our statutory authority and our contractual authority with the United States, we have entered into a broad range of contracts that New Mexico is now calling into question unnecessarily here. The whole crux of their case is that they think that we
gave away too much water, EBID gave away too much water to its sister district to try and repair the problem of groundwater depletions.

That doesn't have to invalidate contracts with the City of El Paso, all of EBID's operation and maintenance contracts up until now. They do not need to attack our authority to continue to operate the project to get out what they're trying to get out in this case.

A good example is look at the Rio Grande compact and how it works. The compact is set up in a way that it only discusses the upstream states' delivery obligations to the downstream states. The upstream state delivers water to the downstream states in discrete delivery points, Colorado to New Mexico at Labatos Gage, New Mexico to Texas at Elephant Butte Dam. That was changed from San Marcial.

Both Colorado and New Mexico's compact in regard to their delivery obligation starts the exact same, "the obligation of Colorado to deliver water in the Rio Grande at Colorado and New Mexico state lines, or the obligation of New Mexico was to deliver water in the Rio Grande at San Marcial."

The delivery obligation for the upstream state is based on index flows indicating a certain
supply level. The compact doesn't specify how the upstream state is to manage in order to get water to the downstream state. It says just do it. It sets up a zero-sum game basically: Just deliver water, and each additional acre-foot sent to the delivery point requires a reduced depletion or storage in the upstream state.

New Mexico never bargained for anything below Elephant Butte Reservoir. The whole reason the compact came into existence was because the senior Rio Grande project was being shorted by development in upstream Colorado and upstream New Mexico, namely, Albuquerque.

And so what New Mexico wanted out of the compact was the right to deplete upstream and have their delivery obligation fixed to the project and not have to worry about it from there. They didn't bargain for anything in our area. The farmers were left to do that on their own through the United States and the State of Texas.

The compact is intended to ensure equitable delivery of water from the upstream state to the downstream state, and downstream states have protections from water supply manipulation by the upstream state, but except for credit water stored in Elephant Butte Reservoir, the upstream state maintains
no interest in water once it's delivered. There's no other interest below the Elephant Butte Reservoir that the State of New Mexico has.

So, you know, their argument now seeking to invalidate the operating agreement is in complete contrast with its own state law and with compact law and the legislature of New Mexico and the Court's longstanding understanding of where the state of New Mexico stood versus where the project stands.

For the first time ever now, New Mexico is coming in and saying, farmers, we don't think you got a good enough deal so we're going to go back and do a hundred years' worth of your authority to operate yourself. Despite the fact that you paid for this, this is your separate right, we're going to come in and tell you how to do this now because we think you gave away too much.

We have that right, Your Honor. Quite
frankly, we have that right and there's no
apportionment that New Mexico can base its rights on to come in and tell us that we're doing it wrong.

They argue this parens patriae doctrine that says, you know, EBID is a creature of the state, and so we represent the state.

What they're really saying is: We think we
should give this obligation to run the project from one state entity to another state entity. It would not be the lawyers in this room on behalf of the State of New Mexico.

They argue this fictitious State of New Mexico idea, but what they're really saying is under the water code, the entity that would be involved in water rights administration in the project if New Mexico had their way, is just another entity set up under state law, the office of the state engineer instead of EBID, and the farmers who paid for this project.

You know, there were a lot of questions in your opening questions to New Mexico and Texas about how all this should work and whether the operating agreement should play a role. At the end of day, this is a zero-sum game between the project and upstream New Mexico. And if upstream New Mexico is allowed to deliver to the reservoir and then come down and take control of our project, what have the farmers really paid for? What did they really invest in?

If the operating agreement is to come into this case, we think that we should be a party. We -- going back to our initial motion to intervene. I don't know how you get beyond the cases that New Mexico
itself cited in the federal district court to bring us into the operating agreement case.

Interestingly enough, New Mexico in that case argued that these claims were not compact claims. But now they're arguing, contrary to in that case, that we don't need to be made a party because they can make these decisions for us.

Contrary to Enterprise Management Consultants v. U.S. and the Jicarilla Tribe case, those were both cited in my brief, we believe these are fundamental issues of due process; that if you are going to get to the operating agreement itself, and thereby all of our other contracts running the project operations, you have to involve the actual contracting parties.

We don't think that you need to do that as part of this case, but if you feel like you need to, we need to be a part of this case, and I believe EP No. 1 would agree.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you. Any other amici want to be heard?

MS. O'BRIEN: Good morning, Your Honor -- or afternoon. Marie O'Brien on behalf of El Paso County Water Improvement District No. 1.

I'll try not to be long. I know I'm
impinging on the lunch hour. It's kind of in the
nature of being a downstream irrigation district of the project. We're used to being in that position.

Your Honor, I want to just focus on U.S. and Texas requests to dismiss the counterclaims 2, 5, 6 and 7. To the extent those are direct challenges, and despite what Mr. Roman says, the counterclaims seek to void, as a matter of law, contracts to which EP No. 1 is a part of the operating agreement and really decades' worth of Miscellaneous Purposes Acts contracts that the district has with City of El Paso and the United States.

New Mexico has no legal basis upon which to prosecute these challenges as counterclaims, and really for two overarching legal reasons: First, New Mexico does not have, as many have touched on today, an apportionment below Elephant Butte as a legal matter.

Moreover, New Mexico does not have a full in-project operation under either the compact or reclamation law, which would serve as a basis for New Mexico to, in fact, seek to dictate or interfere with the terms of reclamation contract between the United States and the two districts.

I think it is worthy of note, and lots of people have talked about shifting positions, but if you look at really the hundred years of project operations
and 80 years of compact operations, New Mexico's position that it now has an apportionment as opposed to water allocated to EBID below Elephant Butte, that it has a compact apportionment for water supply below Elephant Butte, that is a novel argument that has been inserted into this case. In fact, in New Mexico's motion to dismiss, that was not posed or argued.

Also, as Ms. Barncastle referenced in the 2011 case in front of Judge Browning in federal district court in New Mexico, New Mexico disavowed that the claims it brought were compact claims claiming an apportionment.

And Your Honor, just to be clear, you asked a question earlier, yes, standing was raised in that case. It was briefed, it was fully argued in front of Judge Browning. In fact, at oral argument before he stayed the matter, Judge Browning said he was very troubled by the New Mexico's claims against the United States.

And, yes, Mr. Roman is correct. EP No. 1 in the United States argued that the underlying basis and issues New Mexico was raising in that case were issues that will be addressed in this case.

We certainly did not argue that New Mexico should simply super copy its claims in that case and
bring them into this original action as counterclaims. It did not have standing in front of Judge Browning; it does not have standing in front of Your Honor or the Supreme Court to argue those counterclaims.

Your Honor --
THE SPECIAL MASTER: One of the arguments or affirmative defenses that New Mexico raised is acquiescence, and sometimes it's how we label things.

One of the things that $I$ have thought about is the fact that in contract interpretation, if we assume a compact is a contract, is how the contract has been performed off of -- you mentioned compact for 80 years, these contracts for 100. I assume that's going to be relevant.

And I don't know if that gets into acquiescence and how you -- if a party can come back now and say, well, we've done it this way for 80 years, but we have been wrong for 80 years?

MS. O'BRIEN: Your Honor, what I'm talking about, I think our position is really going to relate to factual issues, right?

What I am talking about, in terms of the two legal things that New Mexico would have to demonstrate to be able to come in and bring counterclaims with regard to the operating agreement or the -- let's call
them the MPA claims -- would be that it has a compact apportionment below Elephant Butte and that it has a role in project operations as a legal matter. It does not.

And so it is not whether, you know, there's a record of somebody complaining about New Mexico groundwater pumping, but it is, as a legal matter, how have the parties through the course of dealing conducted themselves and what did the compact contemplate?

What the compact contemplated is that the states, as Ms. Barncastle was describing, have delivery obligations. What does it mean to have delivery obligations? Well, it means that you have taken, in this case New Mexico, your compact apportionment before you deliver. And so New Mexico's compact apportionment is above the reservoir. It's between the Colorado state line up until delivery into the reservoir.

Certainly the compact applies below the reservoir, but it does not apply to allocate/apportion additional water supply to New Mexico's compact apportionment.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Do you agree that what this case is really about is at the end of the day, is Texas and New Mexico getting their allocations of
water? Or apportions of water, excuse me. And if they are not, who's at fault?

In other words, if Texas isn't getting what it's entitled to under the compact, is it because New Mexico's allowing groundwater pumping or is it because the Republic of Mexico is somehow siphoning off water or is it because the United States is mismanaging the project or is it something that Texas has done or a combination of all four?

I mean, is that what we're really going to be talking about in this case?

MS. O'BRIEN: Your Honor, I would agree the case that Texas brought to this court is for -- to determine New Mexico's -- their allegations, of which we support, EP No. 1 supports, is that New Mexico has interfered with, and -- Texas's apportionment under the compact by allowing upstream development of groundwater.

That is actually not a novel claim in an interstate compact case. In fact, in every instance where a downstream state has brought an allegation that groundwater development upstream is depleting the surface flows entitled to the downstream state, the upstream state has lost. So, yes, that is absolutely -- what is the measure of Texas's
apportionment, and to what extent is New Mexico's further groundwater development in New Mexico affecting Texas's compact apportionment.

And, Your Honor, yes, in this case that is going to bring in questions related to the project to the extent that Texas's water runs the gauntlet of the project. It is delivered through the project to Texas.

I would disagree that the United States is an agent of Texas and New Mexico. The United States is -- has a relationship and an agency relationship with the two districts.

But New Mexico and Texas do not play a role in reclamation law or reclamation contracts. If there is an issue with regard to project operations or mismanagement of the project, that is as between the districts and the United States.

And, of course, there always needs to be compliance with any decree that the Supreme Court might enter to finding apportionments.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, are you saying
then that neither state has standing?
MS. O'BRIEN: In this case, Texas has not challenged, under reclamation law, contracts entered into as between the districts and the United States. So I would believe, yeah, that neither state has
standing to come in and direct or interfere with project operations.

Again, that is not saying that project operations need not be compliant with a compact or a decree. But we don't -- we don't have that here at this point. We have vague allegations by New Mexico, first, that they have a compact apportionment below Elephant Butte. They do not.

Even if they were ultimately determined to have that compact -- some kind of compact apportionment as opposed to the benefit of an allocation of EBID, they do not have standing, as they have alleged in this case, or before Judge Browning, to come in and challenge the reclamation contracts.

And that is because while the compact may have incorporated projects, the compact didn't usurp or replace reclamation law or the rights and respective obligations of the districts and the United States under reclamation law.

So under reclamation law, it is the districts that are empowered and authorized to enter into contracts with the United States. What Mr. Roman argued here today is quite extreme in that the compact commission somehow should be a party to and approve or the individual states should come in and approve
individual reclamation contracts.
This simply is not relied on. It does not apply to the operating agreement. It does not apply to miscellaneous purposes, that contract entered into since 1941 between the City of El Paso, EP No. 1, and the United States.

In fact, here, Your Honor, what New Mexico seeks to do with groundwater development in New Mexico is skirt around the requirement to have a Miscellaneous Purposes Act contract to allow use or depletions of project supply under reclamation law.

Yet they are now coming in and saying we get to actually, you know, have standing under reclamation law to approve Miscellaneous Purposes Act contracts, which have been authorized since 1920 under reclamation law, and the compact did not change that.

So, yes, this is about figuring out what Texas -- Texas is clearly entitled to their compact apportionment. It is delivered through the project.

What exactly is that and what harm is New Mexico causing to that compact apportionment? Texas has argued in its complaint that it's entitled to the 1938 condition vis-à-vis the project and water capable of being delivered to Texas under the 1938 condition, and EP No. 1 supports that.

The operating agreement is a compromise amongst the operating agreement parties to try to ameliorate those violations without going to, you know, the more extreme position of saying we're going to look at what went on in 1938.

And, Your Honor, $I$ just want to really correct something that has been just presumed to be the case by both Mr. Roman and repeatedly in Mr. -- in New Mexico's pleadings, and that's first that New Mexico has an apportionment of 57.43 percent.

That 57.43 percent, and we endeavored to set this out clearly in our briefs, as I believe the United States does, is an allocation of acreage as between the two districts, what's the role in these two districts? What are the districts entitled to irrigate?

That does not translate into year in, year out that the water is -- has to be, per the compact, or otherwise, a 57.43 percent allocation. Regardless, the operating agreement does not change the 57.43 percent allocation. Again, it does not mess with this compact apportionment. They do not have one below Elephant Butte.

But that 57.43 percent is not changed by the operating agreement. It's what the United States and the two districts agreed would be done with those
allocations to address what is going on on the ground versus water supply.

So there's now carryover, there's accounting of how are we going to account for depletions in both New Mexico and in Texas. The operating agreement incorporates and addresses both. And that is a task that is left to the districts and the United States, it's in their purview to determine how to operate the project.

Again, the compact, while incorporating the project, does not direct or dictate project operations. That is as among the United States and the district. And New Mexico simply does not have standing under either apportionment claim because it doesn't have one below Elephant Butte.

They got enormous benefit under the compact with regard to its apportionment above. And, again, it does get a benefit by allocation of water to EBID, but that is not the same thing as a compact apportionment.

And, Your Honor, I would just echo what
Ms. Barncastle stated with regard to the districts' need to be parties to this litigation in these counterclaims. The motions to intervene that were denied are not dispositive vis-à-vis the posture of the case as it's presented to you at this point in the
case.
At that point in time, while the district certainly feared that the operating agreement and various reclamation contracts were going to be challenged or were physically challenged, there were not pending counterclaims as seeking to void or invalidate contracts which provide the districts, really, the reason for being: The water supply that they distribute to their constituents.

And we believe that this case should not -- not only should not but could not proceed with the counterclaims challenging the operating agreement and the Miscellaneous Purposes Act contracts without both districts being parties so that they can appropriately defend those interests.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you. Any of other amici wish to be heard?

Hearing none, I'm going to turn to
the -- give each of the parties a few minutes for rebuttal.

Mr. Somach, anything you want to say?
MR. SOMACH: Just a few things, Your Honor.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: I'm sorry.
MR. STEIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
For the record, my name is Jay Stein, counsel
of record for amicus curiae City of Las Cruces, New Mexico.

What I want to do with my time, Your Honor,
is to address one issue, and that is an issue that Your
Honor raised at the beginning of this proceeding, and that is Texas's effort to dismiss four equitable defenses that were raised by the State of New Mexico. And these are the defenses of laches and estoppel and waiver and acquiescence and failure to exhaust administrative remedies that are contained in New Mexico's affirmative defense number 4.

What Texas says is that these -- these
defenses fail as a matter of law. And the reason that they give is, quote, traditionally equitable apportionment or equitable considerations have played no role in determining violations in compact enforcements of proceedings.

And they cite two cases in this regard. The first is the Texas v. New Mexico series. It was filed in the 1980 s . And the second is the Nebraska $v$. Wyoming series that was filed in 1986. And that was to enforce the provisions of the North Platte decree. And our firm was counsel of record for the state of Nebraska in that case.

What Texas is stating is that as a matter of
law, a summary judgment of New Mexico's affirmative defense number 4 should be dismissed. And we propose, Your Honor, that this be denied for three reasons.

The first is that the precedent cited in
Texas v. New Mexico series, and particularly the
Nebraska v. Wyoming series does not support the proposition that they are arguing for. In fact, the Nebraska v. Wyoming case is a precedent against them.

Secondly, the City of Las Cruces asks for the allocation of these equitable doctrines for the protection of its principal well field, the LRG-430 well field, which it relies upon and supplies 21,000 acre-feet of the water to the city, and which has been under development since 1905.

Thirdly, the City has submitted a copy of its adjudication decree for LRG-430 from the state adjudication which displays the uninterrupted development of that well field since 1905, and which, we submit, creates a disputed issue of material fact that requires denial of Texas's motion for partial summary judgment on these issues.

Let me turn first to the Pecos case. The Pecos case was filed in the actions filed in 1974 by the State of Texas alleging violations of the Pecos compact by the State of New Mexico.

The Pecos compact was a 1949 instrument which provided water from the Pecos between New Mexico and Texas. The -- in the second phase of that case, an issue arose with respect to Article $V(a)$ in the Pecos compact, and that was a provision that created the Pecos River Compact Commission, and it created a voting structure on that commission, a one vote each state. In other words, one vote to Texas and one vote to New Mexico but no vote to the United States. And that's unusual because the United States has a voting role under compacts like the Upper Colorado River Basin compact.

As part of the remedy going forward, a prospective remedy going forward in this second phase, Texas proposed that the Court amend the compact, that the Court change the compact and alter, rewrite paragraph or Article $V(a)$ by giving the United States a vote. And the Court decided, well, we can't do that. That's beyond our jurisdiction. This is an enforcement case. And the Court could well have reserved that also the ratification process would have to be undertaken under Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, which would require state ratifications.

But in any event, that process is an entirely different -- the process proposed as a prospective
remedy by the plaintiff state is entirely different than equitable defenses being allowed to be raised by defendants here.

The Nebraska v. Wyoming case is directly on point. In the first phase of that case, summary judgment motions were heard by the Special Master, who was an attorney from Los Angeles. One of these involved four off-stream reservoirs in Wheatland, Wyoming. These reservoirs, known as the inland lakes, stored water in Wyoming, but for use by irrigators downstream in the State of Nebraska.

Now, in the state these were operated by the Bureau of Reclamation. The bureau had not applied for a permit to operate these reservoirs in the early part of the 20 th century under Wyoming law. Nevertheless, they had always been operated together with the rest of the North Platte project with priority of 1904.

Wyoming sought to change that, because of the omission of the United States in applying for a permit, to a later date of 1988. This would have freed up water that would enable them to apply to other -- other purposes.

In Nebraska we argued, no, you can't do that. There's been -- this has gone on for too long. This has gone on for 80 years. There's been a considerable
period of reliance by the downstream irrigators in the State of Nebraska. There is complete acquiescence on the part of Wyoming after raising them.

The special master agreed with us and, more importantly, the Court also agreed. The Court noted that this was an enforcement action but nevertheless recognized that Wyoming's claims would be barred by acquiescence.

And let me quote the passage from the opinion 507 in the U.S. Reporter. The Court wrote: "And even if the issue was not previously determined, we would agree with the special master that Wyoming's arguments were foreclosed by post-decree acquiescence."

Your Honor, the City of Las Cruces seeks the application of that principle and others in the affirmative defense number 24 to its major well field, LRG-430 well field. That well field was under development since 1905. It's been the subject of numerous supplemental replacement wells, all of which have been noticed and have gone to publication.

State of Texas has never appeared as a contestant to contest the grounding of those applications nor has the United States.

There have been two previous lawsuits on the Rio Grande filed by the State of Texas in the original
jurisdiction of this Court, one in 1953 and one in
1969. Neither of them referenced any water usage by the City of Las Cruces as creating a compact violation problem. The City's NPDES permit was regularly renewed on a ten-year basis.

And the second comment, Texas and the United States have never appeared to question or to raise any issues related to the City's water use and the NPDES permit.

So it's our view that the City can avail
itself of these equitable defenses and that they are properly before the court and can be considered by the Court as this matter goes to trial with respect to the City of Las Cruces and perhaps other interests in the State of New Mexico as well.

And as I have indicated earlier, we attached or applied -- we attached a copy of the City's adjudication order from the state adjudication which displays the development of this, and we submit that that creates a disputed issue of a material fact sufficient to the United States' claims in this regard.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you, Mr. Stein.
Anyone else?
MR. BROCKMANN: Thank you, Your Honor. Jim Brockmann for the Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water

Utility Authority.
With my time, I would like to focus on two points, both of which you've raised again with other attorneys. One has to do with the 1938 condition and one with the operating agreement. And both of these do have an effect, or potentially have an effect upstream of Elephant Butte, and that $I$ want to make sure that we bring that to the master's attention.

As you know, Article III and Article IV of the Rio Grande Compact are responsible for shuttling water down the Rio Grande. Under Article III, Colorado has the particular obligation to Labatos gage to the state line, which is a variable flow based upon upstream gauges.

New Mexico has an obligation under paragraph 4 to deliver certain water into Elephant Butte. And, again, it's engaged in that on an annual basis. So there's nothing of a set delivery.

Both of those articles in the compact give each state an apportionment or a right to deplete the river to a certain extent in each of those reaches, and they are all administered separately.

The Water Authority believes that the Court did, in fact, adopt Texas and the United States' argument and said these -- the Rio Grande contract is,
in fact, incorporated into the Rio Grande compact.
There's three places in its opinion at 138
Supreme Court 959 where they make references to that. One has to do with the compact being inextricably intertwined with the Rio Grande project and the downstream compacts.

Another reference within the opinion is that, by way of rough analogy, the compact would be thought to implicitly incorporate the downstream compacts' contracts by reference.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I don't know, is there a disagreement about that? That's Texas's point No. 1, I believe.

MR. BROCKMANN: Well, I heard the United States say they didn't know that an apportionment had been made or had been defined yet in the litigation.

More importantly, and there's a quote in between those two, that states that the United States -- and you made reference to this -- should be thought of -- as an agent of the compact, importantly, charged with assuring that a compact's equitable apportionment to Texas and part of New Mexico is, in fact, made.

So we believe that 57.43 is an apportionment that is made through the compact. 57 percent of the
project water supply for irrigation is New Mexico's apportionment, 43 percent of the project water supply for irrigation is Texas's apportionment, below Elephant Butte reservoir.

Texas goes beyond this in asking for legal determination number 4 indicating that there should be allowed essentially an injunction of -- of depletions beyond the 1938 condition. And you touched on this earlier today.

Texas goes a step further. There's a
footnote 10 in its reply brief where it indicates that if New Mexico were to exceed depletions beyond the '38 condition, that water would have to come above Elephant Butte, okay? That is the argument that the Water Authority has been fearing is going to come out is that somehow this was implicating water supplies upstream of Elephant Butte down.

I don't think there's anything in the Court opinion that indicates there's a 1938 condition. There's nothing in the compact that indicates there's an 1938 condition; there's nothing in compact administration that has been held to a 1938 condition. When the compact was negotiated in '38, the Rio Grande project was in place, and there was a project water supply, and the Court has told us now its
opinion that probably water supply is an apportionment between the two states that's to be protected.

I disagree completely with Mr. Somach that all of the water in the Lower Rio Grande was apportioned as a result of the project being incorporated into the compact.

There are other water supplies in the Lower Rio Grande. There are groundwaters that can be depleted without affecting the project supply. There are groundwaters that can be depleted that affect the river at times of the year other than when the project is taking water. There can be surface influence and accretions in the Lower Rio Grande.

In my opinion, the Court set out a way to solve the case in which what we do is we -- what we do now is we define the project supply, which is going to be variable on an annual basis that's not tied to a '38 condition, but rather, we've got an annual project supply that Texas and New Mexico have an apportionment in, 57 to 43.

New Mexico's job is to protect that as -under Hinderlider the case is very clear, New Mexico has an obligation to administer other water users in the Lower Rio Grande, whether they're surface or groundwater users, to protect an interstate obligation.

New Mexico, I believe, has to be able to have a say in how that project allocation goes because it can affect the 57/43.

But I don't think New Mexico is arguing to be involved in the day-to-day delivery of that water but on a larger level to make sure they have the necessary protection of its 57 percent.

If we have to go and try one of these issues, I think it will be very obvious that all of the equities were not considered in 1938 when the compact was developed. Rather, it was an irrigation apportionment of the Rio Grande project. Nobody looked at the City of Las Cruces or whether it was going to grow or not. And certainly they expected the upstream obligation under Article IV would continue.

And that really wraps up the argument on the '38 condition. It is really inconsistent to have that set '38 condition with the project being the apportionment and with the flexibility that the compact allows under Articles III and IV.

Now, with respect to the operating agreement itself, and The Water Authority's lead, we have taken the position that the operating agreement is invalid, it's null and void. And the reason is it -- both the United States and Texas have acknowledged that it
changes the allocation or the states' apportionment that is now 57 percent to New Mexico project water supply, 43 percent to Texas. It has changed that allocation.

I'm not sure if it's been mentioned today, but the operating agreement has other elements that also affect other New Mexico water users, and one of these is the Water Authority. It creates separate storage accounts in the Elephant Butte Reservoir which causes the project water supply to be managed much differently.

It had changes in evaporation formula that is different than what was done historically, and that also can affect the Water Authority.

In Colorado's brief, they mentioned the possibilities of changes in project operations affecting Colorado upstream because it affects the amount of water in storage. And based upon the amount of water in storage, it can affect whether or not the water can be stored upstream under Article VI.

So the Water Authority has that same concern about how the project is managed and how that change in New Mexico's apportionment kind of ripples downstream.

At the end of the day, and in Justice
Gorsuch's decision, he talked about how the Court had a
certain amount of flexibility, in the compact case, to manage them in the pursuit of justice. And there's been a lot of detailed arguments today about law of the case and whether a particular counterclaim can go forward or not.

The Water Authority would encourage the Special Master to define this case going forward with the necessary sort of bedrock principles, and one of those is going to probably be a 57/43 apportionment of the project supply between the two states; and then, as you indicated in possibly how you might rule on equitable defenses, some of these theories of the parties are going to have to play out and allow evidence to be developed to allow you to recommend to the Court a resolution of the case that will serve all of the parties' interests.

We agree that something -- not this operating agreement, but a different agreement between the states as to how that allegation is made where the State of New Mexico can protect its interest in its 57 percent apportionment and make sure that the reservoir operations are carried out in a way that don't affect downstream is something that the parties can work toward. And if it can be settled, that's something we encourage the Master to consider, a resolution of the
case.
Thank you for allowing the amici time to argue today.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you.
MR. CAROOM: Your Honor, Doug Caroom for El
Paso, and I will be very brief. I have three points I want to make to the court.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: For whom? You're representing who, City of El Paso?

MR. CAROOM: City of El Paso, yeah.
First, and these all relate to the motions that are pending before the Court today as opposed to arguments about what will go on later in the case and what the rights of upstream pumpers might be.

The purpose of the motion to dismiss, as invited by solicitors' amicus brief before the court even accepted the case was to allow New Mexico to present potentially decisive issues of compact construction earlier in the case to simplify its pleading -- its trial.

The New Mexico motion to dismiss presented three issues, the motion itself: One, that New Mexico's obligation to deliver water didn't impact in Elephant Butte.

Two, that there was no requirement to
maintain depletions below Elephant Butte at 1938
levels. And three, that there was no affirmative duty on New Mexico to prevent interference with Rio Grande project deliveries.

Those were the three points of the motion to dismiss. They don't involve disputed facts, and they were all overruled, all for naught. So we would submit that the law of the case, for those three issues certainly, is exactly the opposite of what New Mexico was arguing on the motions to dismiss.

Regarding the counterclaims pending before the Court, I would submit that not expanding the scope of the case is the key for dealing with counterclaims. You have some of the counterclaims that ask for voiding the contracts and prior agreements you know of, well, both the 2008 operating agreement and the water supply agreements under the Miscellaneous Purposes Act. Those clearly expand the case beyond what we have.

The other issues, as the Court was pointing out, really are defensive issues. New Mexico had -- wants to argue that nothing in Texas is impacting compact deliveries and not to be considered, and they can do that with or without a counterclaim. They want to argue that pumping in Mexico is having the same effect. And they can argue that.

Each of the other counterclaims' points, we would submit, really are defensive issues that can be presented without a counterclaim. So the thing to do to maintain the scope of the case and prevent its enlargement so we can go forward is to deny all the counterclaims.

Last point regarding counterclaim number 7 specifically, which is the miscellaneous purposes contracts, in New Mexico's reply brief, they kind of hedged and said that these contracts altered the compact apportionment between Texas and New Mexico. They didn't explain how.

But the point I want to make is all of these contracts that El Paso is in, and I think that's all of them that there are, involve El Paso contracting with EP No. 1, a Texas district. So that this is project water that is allotted to EP No. 1 that is available for purchase by El Paso pursuant to the terms of the Miscellaneous Purposes Act.

We're not taking any water that's allotted to New Mexico. Even though I think EBID could sell it if they chose to do so. But the point I want to be sure we understand is those contracts are for Texas water. They are not changing the apportionment at all.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you. Yes.
MS. DAVIDSON: Thank you, Your Honor. I know you were hopeful no one else would speak, but I'll try to make it quick. I'm Tessa Davidson. I'm the attorney for New Mexico Pecan Growers, and I've been asked also to speak on behalf of the Southern Rio Grande Diversified Crop Farmers Association, who filed a motion for leave to join our brief in this matter, our amicus brief.

And our farmers collectively irrigate approximately 60,000 acres of crops and orchards in the Lower Rio Grande in New Mexico, and our farmers use surface water deliver on EBID and also groundwater from their individual wells that they've drilled in the basin.

And our brief addresses the issue of New Mexico's standing to pursue its claims involving the operating agreement. And it was our brief that you mentioned earlier where we do recognize that the operating agreement could provide an effective framework for a remedy in this action.

But the reason we believe New Mexico must be allowed to participate on its claims is because the operating agreement effectively -- it's effect on farmers in New Mexico causes New Mexico farmers to have
less surface water to use for irrigation and to rely more heavily on groundwater.

And that implicates the State's interest, it implicates other users in New Mexico that rely on groundwater. And New Mexico administers groundwater. And we believe that in order to fully resolve all of the issues affecting New Mexico farmers, the State needs to participate on those issues.

When the operating agreement was executed, the way it was sold to the farmers is that it's okay. More surface water is going to go down to Texas to account for offsetting the effects of groundwater pumping, and in exchange you'll be able to replace your irrigation needs with groundwater.

So, in effect, it made us more reliant on groundwater, the very thing Texas is suing New Mexico over now, and even some joke that -- it's not even a joke, it's just a refrain that we hear often, that the operating agreement effectively transformed EBID into a groundwater district, because we get so little surface water now with the operating agreement.

However, because the parties to the agreement didn't seek New Mexico's approval of this new regime for EBID farmers, that led to the suit in the federal district court case, which led to the retaliation suit
here in this action.
As a consequence, New Mexico's farmers now have no guarantee on how much groundwater they can use. They're being sued -- or New Mexico is being sued for farmer pumping in this case, and under New Mexico's prior appropriation doctrine farmers now have to rely more on what we call junior groundwater rights to New Mexico to reach our irrigation demands.

And I think it's important, Your Honor, to understand what New Mexico's appropriation doctrine provides. Under our doctrine in New Mexico, the state engineer's charged with administering water rights and producing priority dates to ensure that New Mexico complies with its compact obligations.

And in New Mexico, if you have a senior water right that's not being fully fulfilled, you can make a priority call on a junior user and seek to shut them off. Because it's best to be senior in a water system, especially within with a downstream compact obligation, the parties of New Mexico have been actively litigating the prior case in the Lower Rio Grande adjudication for decades now, and in that adjudication, New Mexico takes the position that the farmers' right to use surface water is the same date as the United States'
appropriation of Rio Grande project water. And so
currently the Court in that case is determining that to be a 1903 priority date.

New Mexico also takes the position that the day you drill a groundwater well establishes the priority date for your right to use groundwater. So generally, you can imagine most farmers drilled their groundwater wells after the project was constructed and after 1903.

There's also others in the basin that claim a senior right to all of the farmers' rights in surface water and groundwater, and some of those folks sought to intervene in this case. And the City of Las Cruces has made those claims against the farmers.

And so the farmers currently are working to try and resolve all these interstate priority disputes because they're kind of caught between a rock and a hard place.

They are for surface water. Their senior right to surface water is going downstream. They are left with junior groundwater rights with no guarantees on how they can use them or that a senior's not going to call against them. So we're actively working with others right now to try and resolve these interstate disputes.

And we're making progress. We do have a
settlement framework, and we are making progress so that water rights administration can work well for compact obligations in New Mexico.

But it's for the very reason that we're kind of stuck in this priority, I don't know, Catch-22, I guess, it's for that very reason that EBID cannot represent the entirety of all of the farmers' interests under the operating agreement because each farmer has an individual interest in any reduction of surface water because they must replace it with groundwater.

And in doing so, you have higher pumping costs; you have to drill or maintain wells, you have to make sure that the aquifer is managed so that you have a long-term supply of water to New Mexico, and you have to manage increased soil salinity.

And EBID is not the party that's going to represent the farmers' interests in this matter. As to those consequences, the State of New Mexico is the only party that can represent our interest in that regard.

As you've heard -- and I do find it, actually, very ironic to listen to the disputes regarding New Mexico's standing to challenge the operating agreements and allocation procedures because it's that very dispute that led us here, and you've heard that today.

I also find it very interesting that Texas and the United States do not know what allocation the downstream contracts established originally, yet they do know that New Mexico has violated this unknown standard. And in that regard, if that's true, then New Mexico certainly has the right to claim that its apportionment under those downstream contracts have also been violated by the new allocation procedures in the operating agreement.

It's our belief that New Mexico's claims involving the operating agreement must be heard in this action to protect our dual interests in irrigation water in New Mexico and essentially ask that you deny the motions to strike New Mexico's complaint on the operating agreement.

Thank you.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Thank you. We -- I was kind of -- I'd still like to finish the hearing before lunch if that is agreeable with everyone, go a little longer, but $I$ do think we need to take a 10-or 15-minute break if we want to continue. So let's break for a few minutes. We'll take 15.
(Recess taken from 12:53 p.m. to 1:10 p.m.)
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Please be seated. All
right. Are we done with the amici or anybody else wish
to be heard?
MR. JONES: If Your Honor please, my name is
Alvin Jones. I am with the Southern Rio Grande
Diversified Crop Farmers Association. I'm the other half of Ms. Davidson's presentation. If you'd just --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Why don't you come forward.

MR. JONES: Yes, sir. So I don't know what became of my motion to appear. It's amicus, but it's still there somewhere, Judge, and I'd be grateful to find it and move on. I don't think anybody opposed it.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I'd have to go take a look at the motion. I don't recall seeing it. I know you've listened in on some calls. I didn't know that you had actually filed a notion, and I need to take a look at it.

MR. JONES: I appreciate it, Judge.
Thank you, sir.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Mr. Somach?
MR. SOMACH: I just want to address a few points they made, and $I$ will try to do it as briefly as possible.

The first, you asked, I think Mr. MacFarlane, whether or not everything was frozen in 1938. We do believe that the physical situation was frozen as of

1938 because that was the deal that was cut, and -- but the law itself isn't frozen. Reclamation law moves ahead. And to the extent that changes in law don't affect a compact, they are very appropriate in terms of moving -- moving forward, but I just wanted to distinguish those two things.

The physical situation that has depletions, that is how one determines what each state gets. And if it's a rolling target, then there is no -- there's nothing set there.

And referring to something Mr. Brockmann said, we have argued it. We do believe that it's the 1938 condition that's the baseline for discussion. But that language comes right out of the Special Master's report. You know, the reference to it is from the report, and it responded directly to the allegations that New Mexico made that it had no obligation to maintain depletion of a 1938 compact level.

So that when you follow where the issue generated from, it generated from the motion to dismiss and from our complaint. The motion to dismiss was in response to our statement that it was a 1938 condition. They said that it wasn't a 1938 condition. The Special Master addressed that, and he said it is a 1938 condition.

So, you know, one can argue, but our position is that was part and parcel of what was before the Court and the Special Master in the motion to dismiss that is to be decided.

Mr. Roman began by -- and I don't know why, but he began by talking about shifting positions, leveling that charge against the United States and Texas. From -- and I will say this uncategorically, without any qualification, you could read every brief we have submitted, every document we have submitted, our positions have been consistent. They have not changed. They have not vacillated whatsoever.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I thought, and this will get back to something Mr. MacFarlane was saying, I thought if there was one thing in this case that was undisputed, it was that there would be X amount of water released that was project water and that Texas got 43 percent and New Mexico got 57 percent.

Now, it may be that that the water districts get that, and so I don't want to get into that discussion. But I thought if there was one thing that wasn't going to be in dispute, it was 43/57. Now I understand that's not even agreed upon.

MR. SOMACH: Well, I think Ms. Davidson said that somehow the United States and Texas are confused
about apportionment.
I began by saying we believe, and this is very consistent with what the districts say, we believe that the Article IV delivery obligation is -- is a delivery to Texas, into the reservoir. And I think I said that's why the Texas Rio Grande commissioner can make demands on Texas and Colorado related to debits and credits in that reservoir.

And what I said was that what Texas got was subject to the contract with EBID and the treaty with Mexico. I said that to Mr. Grimsal in the argument of the motion to dismiss. He did not agree with me on that point.

And he talks or he -- the terminology there does talk in terms of apportionments to Southern New Mexico. And somebody said also earlier, was in some respects it doesn't matter because of what -- the way Special Master Grimsal dealt with that issue was by saying certainly Texas's apportionment and its delivery into the reservoir, and he termed what EBID got as apportionment, but he said they relinquished dominion and control over that water, which meant they agreed to the arrangement by which that water was allocated to the districts.

And that's why I said you've got to look at
its validity, among other things, you have 57/43, that's a hundred percent, but $I$ indicated earlier a hundred percent isn't going to meet all the irrigation demands, the 155,000 total acres. You have to have return flow so you actually have to have 120 percent of the water in order to get all those lands irrigated, and that's why you have to deal with that project as a unity.

At various times you will hear, when we get into the factual arguments, the discussion of compact Texas, and it was because what New Mexico negotiated for, and I know Ms. Barncastle alluded to this, was the middlemen, that's what they cared about.

It was left, in terms of the history of negotiations, to the Texas commissioner to negotiate for the unity, because it was the only way Texas was going to get its water was to ensure that it operated as a unit. In fact, one of the negotiators for Texas was actually from New Mexico. So we'll get into that, but it's the unity of the project and the it's going to operate which $I$ think is a critical -- you know, a critical element.

And let me also say this: Texas has never said, nor does it believe it could interfere with the contracts that exist for the project. This is in
contrast to the New Mexico position. And that is because we do believe that those downstream contracts are important. They were what we agreed to when we negotiated the compact.

The water that is apportioned to Texas is
either in the contract with EP No. 1, EP No. 1 and El Paso, as has been described, or Hudspeth. We don't -- there is no separate giving of water by the State of Texas outside of those contracts.

And we are not -- that, $I$ think, is what differentiates. The issue came around about whether or not we're -- what we're arguing. What we're trying to do is protect the apportionment, the totality of that, from New Mexico's activities by obtaining more than they were entitled to.

That's quite different than trying to dictate, you know, what is -- what that water could be utilized for. We do not and would not take the water away from EP No. 1 and give it to El Paso, for example.

I'm not sure whether New Mexico believes, because it's got some apportionment, it could take the water away from EBID and give it to Las Cruces. I, quite frankly, don't know the answer to that because they've started getting into and trying to deal with contracts. We have not done that. It differentiates,

I believe, our case from theirs.
I did want to come back just briefly to this question of the exceptions and New Mexico's exceptions. I took this out of their brief. They said the purpose of New Mexico's exceptions were to preserve the critical complaint -- compact interpretation issues for trial, when the Court would have a full record on which to base its decision, and then they say the Court gave precisely that. This is at their consolidated last brief at ten.

But that just defies any way any logical person would look at what occurred. They made exceptions. They may have -- I have no idea, you know, could be that's what they were trying to do. But they ignore the fact that the Court rejected their exceptions.

So if their intention was to preserve those exceptions by filing their position -- the compact interpretation by filing their exceptions, the Court rejected that. I mean, if anything, they rejected their exceptions.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Did you read the Supreme Court's opinion when they say the exceptions are overruled, but we have to go through each exception and then say, okay, this one is overruled, this one is
overruled?
MR. SOMACH: I don't think you have to do that. There were only exceptions filed by Colorado, the United States, and New Mexico. That's all that were there.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I know.
MR. SOMACH: The United States' exceptions were granted.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: They were sustained, and
I think I'd have -- I think the language was exceptions of the United States are sustained and all other exceptions are overruled.

MR. SOMACH: Are overruled. And so how do you get we won out of, in fact, you lose. It befuddles me.

The issues with respect to the MPA, the water supply and the operative, that we've talked about. I don't think $I$ need to say much more about that, other than the fact that $I$ think that a dismissal of those causes of action doesn't mean that if somehow there's -- there are actions that are depriving New Mexico what they are entitled to, that those things don't get litigated as part and parcel of the compact dispute. It's just that they're not separate causes of action under those statutes, and that's the way they've
been pled.
I actually don't want to spend any time responding to Colorado's claims. We responded thoroughly to those arguments in our brief, and I didn't hear anything in there that responded to the arguments that we made in our briefs. And we maintain on each one of the issues that our positions are correct and that, among other things, Colorado misconstrues much of what -- the basis, the foundation upon which their arguments are made. But we fully responded to those, and so I'm not certain that it would be productive to just repeat what we've already briefed.

I wanted to move into the final issues that were raised by the last three amicus. And the first is, again, with respect to our affirmative defenses -I mean the motion to -- the Rule 56 motion on the affirmative defenses.

A fundamental legal theory that we believe is accurate is that you can't change what the compact says and that there's -- and that's been the longstanding view of the Court. The issue you raised earlier, and I thought was a significant issue, and that is, well, I may not be able to tell you you're not entitled to get what the compact says you're entitled to get, but it
doesn't negate the damages to somebody. There's nothing in the compact that tells me or dictates what damages are. And I think that -- and I want to make certain that I'm clear that when I -- when I was concurring on that, that's what $I$ was concurring on. I am not stepping back one bit from the argument that says you can't use those equitable defenses to change what the compact says. And here I think we've got to be careful because the parties do this all the time because they sign -- they cite equitable apportionment cases from compact cases.

Those are not the two same -- actually, an apportionment case is a case where the Court exercises equitable powers to create an apportionment. Compact is, as you've indicated, a very significant but still a contract. And the case law indicates that the court will not rewrite this compact, once again, a compact, regardless, and there is no case where they've done that. No one has cited that case. If it's there, we'll take a look at it. But no one has cited that case.

## Finally, I wanted to respond to a couple

 of -- this lawsuit's not a retaliation lawsuit. I don't know where that came from, but we did not file this case -- we would never file a case in the UnitedStates Supreme Court invoking the original jurisdiction of the Court -- of a court in retaliation for the fact that they sued under the operating agreement. After all, we weren't even a party to the operating agreement.

This suit was filed because New Mexico was not doing anything to remedy the situation, and we'll put evidence on this, despite the fact that we have been, for a very long period of time, seeking some redress from the State of New Mexico on those issues.

Second thing is, this lawsuit is against the State of New Mexico. This is not a lawsuit against Southern New Mexico. And suggestions somehow that all burdens should be borne by Southern New Mexico is incorrect.

This goes to the idea that what New Mexico got was protection of the Middle Rio Grande. And so they can't have it both ways. They can't protect the Middle Rio Grande and then just keep taking more and more water below the Elephant Butte Reservoir.

And so all we suggested, and I believe that when remedies come -- as we know, the Court doesn't like to give money damages. The Court would prefer to give water.

And all we're saying is there's only so much
water in southern -- in New Mexico and in the Rio Grande project. And if more water needs to be provided, it's -- this lawsuit is against the State of New Mexico. And if they have to provide more water, regardless of where it has to come from, they will have to provide that water.

I have remedies, but I just wanted to make certain that this is not indemnity against Southern New Mexico at all, quite frankly. It's quite the opposite. But this is a lawsuit against Southern New Mexico. Any remedy will have to be from the State of New Mexico, whether that be in dollars or whether that be in water.

Thank you.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Mr. MacFarlane?
MR. MACFARLANE: Thank you, Your Honor.
Someone once said never trust an attorney who stands up and says, Your Honor, I'll be brief, but I want to make three quick points in rebuttal.

First, on sovereign immunity. A sovereign
immunity waiver is for narrow, tailored, specific kinds of remedies and claims. It's a tool to be applied to ensure that only cognizable claims are heard and to prevent a case from expanding without limit into general grievances. New Mexico's contention -THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, let me ask you the
question I asked Mr. Roman, which is, let's assume at the end of the day it's determined that Texas is not getting the water to which it's entitled under the compact. But it's through no fault of New Mexico's because of mismanagement of the project or you're giving Mexico, instead of 60,000 you're giving them 150 or whatever, where does sovereign immunity fit into all that?

MR. MACFARLANE: Well, I think you're
actually anticipating the second point $I$ was going to make. You asked Mr. Roman could you, at the end of the day, issue a decree that included an injunction ordering the United States to do $X, Y$ and $Z$.

If we're not a defendant, if we haven't
waived our sovereign immunity to claims against us, as opposed to the claims we brought as a plaintiff, then $I$ think the answer to that question is no.

But Your Honor can issue a decree, and the United States can look at it and determine if our present project operations are consistent with that decree, make changes if necessary -- after all, we are the project operator -- and if somebody disagrees with our conclusions, then, you know, we are subject to claims in district court under the Administrative Procedure Act or, you know, wherever.

But I think it's not to say that there isn't a remedy, but I think your position as the Special Master here, and ultimately the Court, is to fashion a decree which declares what the equitable apportionment is that's in dispute here, and as -- you know, the United States will be bound by that decree, as we said we would be.

We intervened to allow full resolution of the issues in the case as those issues existed in early 2018 before New Mexico filed its counterclaims, and we did not open ourselves up to any counterclaim that could be dreamed up or somehow tied in to an alleged violation of compact.

I think, you know, in our earlier colloquy we got to the point where I think the -- there is an understanding that the case can be litigated on the basis of Texas's complaints and those counterclaims against Texas, and it will result in a decree declaring what the equitable apportionments are below Elephant Butte Reservoir and dispose of the significant issues that are involved there.

My third and final point has to do with the infamous 57/43. There is nothing in the supreme Court's decision that tells that that was a division of water between New Mexico and Texas.

The only reference to 57/43 in the Court's opinion had to do with the percentage of irrigable acres in the project. Out of a total of 155 irrigable acres, 57 percent are located in EBID, 43 percent in EP No. 1. That is a very, very different thing from dividing up project water supply along a 57/43 divide. THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, they may not have specifically said it, but they also said, and I just went back and reread it, because I was curious, over the break I reread the decision, although I have probably read it 20 times already, but they said that also 57/43 was the allocation between the two districts as to what they were going to pay for.

MR. MACFARLANE: Right, construction costs.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: And the implication was that that was because that was the allocation of water they were receiving.

MR. MACFARLANE: No, that's not correct, Your Honor. And I don't believe the Court said that and I don't believe that's a fair inference of what the Court said.

Those were the allocated shares of project construction costs based upon number of irrigable acres in each district.

The 57/43 division of water, however that's
defined, and frankly, we would ask 57 percent,
43 percent of what? Are we talking about project supply? Are we talking about project releases? Are we
talking about project supply before we account for
depletions from groundwater pumping or after?
These are all -- it is a very, very tricky
issue to get your arms around. New Mexico may think that a $47 / 53$ division of project supplies has been agreed to. It has not. I think that's basically New Mexico's position. And that -- you know, if they want to make that their position, that's their business. But it's not something, frankly, that any authority has declared, decreed or resolved.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Did Mr. Grimsal make a finding on that?

MR. MACFARLANE: I don't believe he did. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Mr. Roman?
MR. ROMAN: We've been here for a very long time today, especially you, Your Honor, amongst all of us, so I too will be quite brief and make clear that by not addressing issues we're certainly not acquiescing to them, but this has all been briefed very extensively.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: I understand.

MR. ROMAN: I first want to briefly touch on what Mr. Somach was saying about the 1938 condition, especially with respect to the contention that it is something that was already established as law of the case by the Special Master report somehow without being adopted by the Court. Because there is no basis for their suggested ' 38 condition in a compact itself or in the Court's opinion.

And there was no evidence taken on this issue, nor could there have been. Given that it was a motion to dismiss, we were at $\mathrm{a} 12(\mathrm{~b})(6)$ stage. So I think that reading into the fact that an exception was denied that didn't even explicitly address the '38 condition because it was part of the reasoning, potentially, tangentially, in a special master's initial report, which, again, was not adopted in full by the court, would be taking it way too far.

This is something on which, if the parties did, in fact, agree to that, as Mr. Somach suggested, then at the very least the Court would certainly need to take a significant amount of historical evidence on the nature of the discussion, the nature of what was agreed to, and should not be seen as having been established already as a law of the case.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, that's one of the
things I was going to say is that one of the exceptions you made was to the extensive historical analysis that was done in the report.

I don't think $I$ can agree that we did all the ruling, that the Supreme Court adopted every single section of that 200-page historical analysis.

MR. ROMAN: Agreed.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Maybe that is
Mr. Somach's position. I'm not sure.
MR. ROMAN: I also want to briefly touch on a statement that Your Honor just made about when you were characterizing hasn't the 57/43 been established, I believe you referred to it as 57 percent of project releases, and I just wanted to make the distinction, and I think that Mr. MacFarlane somewhat brought that up too, the distinction between project releases and project deliveries.

Because this has been discussed, there's kind of a multiplier in the project. If it was only 57 percent of project releases that were apportioned to New Mexico, then in fact, given that multiplier effect of return flows, the 43 percent would, in fact, be much greater than 43 percent.

So I think instead what we would say is what was apportioned was 57 percent of project deliveries
and 43 percent of project deliveries. Because the way that the project is operated is given a particular release, say a full release of 790 -- 790,000 acre-feet, there is -- a larger amount can then be delivered over time to those farms.

So it would be 57 percent of that larger amount from top to bottom that the system operated as a whole is delivered to the farms throughout the project. Just wanted to make that distinction clear.

And, finally, maybe to end on a little bit of a hopeful note, there is something that I believe we can say we absolutely do agree with Texas' side.

Mr. Somach said that the equitable defenses cannot change what the compact says, what the apportionment is. We couldn't agree more. That's very true. And that's why all of our equitable defenses go towards damages, towards has there been a violation in the past that has not been brought to people's attention.

You characterized this earlier as basically a big, complex contract case, and in a contract enforcement proceeding, those are available defenses. Because by not being put on notice of an alleged violation through years and years and years, the law has said that's not fair.

And this is a compact apportionment
enforcement case. The same logic applies to that. But to be very clear, we are not seeking to reform the terms of the compact or to change the apportionment from what we believe it already is through making those arguments and saying because it wasn't raised, somehow we have a larger apportionment than we were originally given.

And with that, unless you have other questions, $I$ will wrap it up.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: No. I do have some questions for the group as whole, but no.

MR. ROMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: All right. Well, unless there's anything further, we'll show at least this part of the proceeding closed, the motions submitted.

I'd indicated a couple other things we wanted to talk about was this, what $I$ thought, was a discovery motion, which $I$ understand now it's not, so we can skip over that.

The other issue is $I$ wanted to talk a little bit about the schedule. It's obviously slipped some, and hopefully we can stay on schedule with the new proposed trial date. And if there's any further slippage, it's going to come between that close of discovery and the trial date.

One thing I wanted to discuss, and it's actually -- Mr. Somach alluded to this in one of his arguments, and other parties as well, there's apparently going to be a fair amount of evidence and maybe expert testimony presented relative to historical analysis, for want of a better term, of the context in which the compact was negotiated and other historical issues that may be relevant to the case.

And I know that New Mexico objected to the former special master going, what they considered to be outside the record, and doing his own independent research and then doing an historical analysis.

But having said that, is anybody -- is there that much fundamental disagreement? I mean, is there -- can that form the basis of a historical analysis or a historical context for this dispute, the parties can then supplement if they feel there's additional information that's required or maybe address specific inaccuracies that they feel are contained in the first interim report.

I'm just wondering, is there some way to take advantage of all the work and all the -- of everything that's been set out and not duplicating those 200 pages with a whole new start-to-finish historical analysis? Mr. Roman?

MR. ROMAN: Your Honor, can I address that first? Yes, thank you. We would be utterly opposed to taking what work had been done on the basis that we don't even know how the original special master chose which items to look at. Those were not tested through cross-examination. He may have adopted certain people's -- certain historians' views of certain things which are very much, potentially, contradicted by other historians that weren't consulted, or maybe were consulted and he decided not to adopt those.

This is fundamental to this case. We have, right now, an argument that there wasn't even an apportionment to New Mexico below Elephant Butte, that the parties agreed that there would be a '38 condition as part of this, even though they somehow never put it into the compact itself, even though other compacts do have that type of provisions in them, and $I$ think, respectfully, it would be inviting error to take work that had already been done without it going through the crucible of cross-examination and development and true expert reports put forth by the parties.

If there is a concern about saving time, I would say it's more important to get it right, and we can't be -- any party here should be worried about being stuck with certain findings or with certain
positions that the special master adopted without taking evidence on those specific issues by the parties.

And right now we're in a position where people are having to do historical reports without their being an agreed-upon even period of record to look at. We don't know what the geographic scope of this case is. Does it end at the state line? Does it go into the project as a whole? There are a lot of uncertainties.

But what we can't have, to have a good resolution of this case that $I$ think has solid grounding and that informs Your Honor, truthfully, of the real basis for a lot of these claims is kind of picking and choosing piecemeal from a summary that was not based on testimony or evidence or crossexamination by anybody in the party, and I would urge there to be a full evidentiary hearing on the historical things the same way that there would be on any other important part of this case.

And I don't say that simply because in my view the first special master had a bunch of holes or got some things wrong. I say that as a litigant, that I think it's fairer to everybody to hear that type of evidence.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Mr. Somach?
MR. SOMACH: Yeah. We've never said, and this goes to the point that $I$ think was at the end of the argument, the only thing we say from that report that is there are those five points. That's why we pulled those out.

That said, we don't have a problem with the massive amount of work that the special master went to, and it seems to me that a logical way of protecting New Mexico from what they're concerned about is if there are specific objections, rather than take the -- because, quite frankly, it's all part of what we will do is repackage all that stuff in one form or another.

It seems silly to have to go through all of that effort since it's there. If there's something in particular that might be subject to disagreement and, therefore, perhaps additional testimony or expert work on it, that's a better way of proceeding.

That focuses us down and it also, of course, allows us to operate within the time frame we have, but in terms of getting expert reports done and getting the trial -- this case ready for trial in the time that we've had.

So I don't think that there's any argument
that those factual issues are in any way, shape or form -- while in this case, the special master said they were not. But there's a lot of good stuff there, and it seems really silly to kind of throw it out and have to just repackage it.

If there's an issue with it, why not just
focus on the issue and make that the point of
litigation as opposed to unwrapping the whole thing?
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Now, we're only about 60 days away from your reports being due. Have you hired a historian?

MR. SOMACH: We have. And I'll let the United States speak for themselves. I'm not as concerned what the United States has. The historian was going to fill in.

Let me say there's two universes of historic information. This goes to this question of if the basic compact interpretation the special master did was a matter of law, because it was an unambiguous compact, then one doesn't have to put in extrinsic evidence to interpret the compact. So it kind of hinges on the decision that you will make at one point in time.

And on the other hand, if there's a
determination that it is ending and that those legal determinations are not binding and that there is a need
for extrinsic evidence, then there's another whole universe of historic expert materials that will have to be added to the report we're doing, and that will create a time crunch for us to do that. THE SPECIAL MASTER: Mr. MacFarlane? MR. MACFARLANE: Thank you, Your Honor. In terms of the -- well, our -- we have hired a historian but only relatively recently. Our view is that, to be perfectly candid, part of what we would need the historian to do may depend on how Your Honor rules on these law of the case issues. And if those are going to be open again for litigation and factual development, then we have to get somebody cracking on that.

Frankly, $I$ think, in terms of an expert historian report, a May 31 deadline is just about impossible. But looking closely at the schedule, the most recent schedule that Your Honor issued at the end of January, you've got about ten months between close of discovery and the trial date, and I think there is some time there that through maybe compressing the schedule for dispositive motions, that we could maybe build in an extension of some time for the disclosure of expert reports on historical matters and depositions of expert historians without further delaying the
trial.
So we would urge Your Honor to give that some serious consideration. And like I said, I mean, I -- you know, we did not object to Special Master Grimsal's tutorial and investigation that he conducted on his own on the history of the Rio Grande compact, although I do understand the concerns that have been raised about it.

We don't think he necessarily got it wrong, but at the same time, I mean, if we are going to have full-blown discovery and basically replay all of those issues, I think it's going to depend, to some degree, on how Your Honor rules on the law of case matter, but if we are going to get into extensive discovery on that, we need to know that kind of up front so that we can get our experts directed and moving forward as quickly as possible, and we will definitely need some relief on that May 31st deadline.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, I guess that's the plan I was making. And I'm not even sure that it was inappropriate for the special master to do the research. I mean, certainly as a judge you oftentimes have to go do your own independent research if you don't feel that what the parties have presented to you fully answers the question.

So I'm not saying it was inappropriate. And I guess the question is, is it wrong? If it's not wrong, what's the difference? I mean, why reinvent the wheel?

And I understand New Mexico would be saying, well, we don't like the procedure, but I'm not sure you're saying it's wrong and -- and I understand maybe you don't think it's complete. And if that's the case, you can supplement it. But why not just tell us what's wrong about it or what you feel you need to add to it to make it complete?

MR. ROMAN: Well, Your Honor, for one thing, it sets up a position where the default is essentially what was done in independent research without any input from the parties, and then it becomes up to the party to basically try to overturn what the default assumption is rather than having independent reports where based on rebuttal reports, based on depositions, based on, well, did you consider this, did you consider that, we don't have any basis for knowing what it was that led to some of these conclusions that the special master came to, and the way to do that is to be able to depose the parties' experts and --

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, why not just have your historian look at it and say, yeah, I agree with
this, I agree with this, I agree with this, I agree with this. I looked at those same source documents, and the conclusions are reasonable, but he missed others, or I disagree with him, which is -- but why not have your historian just look at this and say what's wrong with it?

MR. ROMAN: In some way, it really turns the process on its head, and rather than having an organic report that can be put together thematically from start to finish that actually ties things up, you're instead poking at various places in a report that someone else put together that may be set up completely differently.

It really robs the parties, each party, of the chance to tell their story and to explain it in a cohesive way. And if another party is very happy with the way that the special master put things and the research that they happen to do and the sources that they happen to use, then by all means that can certainly be incorporated into another report and it wouldn't -- it wouldn't really add to the burden. Because for them, it's already been done.

But, again, to have us be in a position of having to just be reactive to something that wasn't based on anything that any of the parties did is in some ways kind of a black box of where did all of this
come from is really, $I$ think, putting certainly us, but I think really all parties, in an unfair position of nothing being able to -- I think they have the right to frame their arguments and collect the arguments in the way they want to frame them.

I'm certainly cognizant of not reinventing
the wheel or wasting time. This is fundamental, it's not a waste of time, and the parties shouldn't be deprived of the opportunity to present the type of evidence that they want to present.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, let me think about how we're going to approach that issue.

I guess the only other thing $I$ was going to mention -- or $I$ really wasn't going to mention, I decided, I'll just throw it out, is -- and I understand Mr. Somach's position that this was not a retaliation lawsuit, but I also understand that to some extent -and I'm not asking for a commitment from Texas, they were sort of in a position where they could play with the operating agreement, and of course the United States and the two water districts are a party to it -New Mexico says, well, we are kind of mad because we weren't a party to it, but we probably could have lived with it. Pecan Growers said they could live with it. If everybody could live with it, why isn't that the
basis of sitting down and trying to work this thing out?

MR. ROMAN: I would be very careful of
agreeing that we ever said we could live with it as constituted.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: You said you could live with it with a few modifications.

MR. ROMAN: And the extent of those
modifications would certainly be part of any discussions we have. I think that what we would call modifications might be called significant changes by other folks or we might say we just need a few tweaks and they might say, well, that's way too big.

As currently constituted, the State is not comfortable and cannot support the operating agreement because we believe that it is inequitable in terms of assessing too much of the damage, as I said before, if any, to New Mexico from things outside of its control.

So, yes, some of it is just a procedural
issue of we can't be having these modifications going on that truly change apportionment that don't give us any opportunity to weigh in on them, but it's much more than just procedurally.

It is the facts in the operating agreement and the way in which it operates that we believe are,
as currently constituted, unfair. But as a framework for something and working it out, it truly is something that we believe we can work with with the other parties and with the districts to come up with something that does truly account for the effect of hydrologically connected groundwater pumping in New Mexico or it truly does account for any water that should be getting to Texas that isn't getting to Texas.

Of course, that begs the question in some ways of what should be getting to Texas. But assuming we can work with that, especially if we go back to how the project has historically been operated up until the time of the operating agreement, where a certain amount of groundwater pumping through 1978 was factored into that, and it's only deviations from that post '78 until the operating agreement started that are really at issue, then, yes, it's something that $I$ think we can work with and we'll have -- it's a scientific question as much as a legal one, Your Honor.

And if we can get scientists together to actually look at this and agree on some of the parameters and then allocate where blame, if you want to call it blame, should be laid, then $I$ do think it's something that we can work with in a way of moving on. THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, I wasn't even
going to bring this up. Because I -- well, first of all, I don't want to be involved in settlement discussions, but $I$ also know from the special master manual that they recommend that we encourage settlement at every opportunity.

And I assumed that the settlement is probably premature at this point in the sense that, as you have mentioned, Mr. Roman, maybe scientists have to get together and make some assessments of current conditions and where the blame lies, so to speak, but I just thought that if that could form a framework, do you want try to do it -- start talking about it now before a bunch -- you know, the longer the case goes, there's the cost factor, which is not inconsequential.

But maybe even more of a factor is the one that was raised about just everybody's under this cloud of uncertainty. And if this case goes on for another 5 or 10 years, that means 5 or 10 more years of uncertainty in addition to the substantial out-of-pocket costs that are forming. I guess that's something --

MR. ROMAN: Could I address that real quickly, Your Honor? Because I agree completely, you know. I'm on the ground, you know, I hear about the consequences of that uncertainty. And for some of the
municipalities, maybe their uncertainty is lying with a decision that might come 10 or 15 years down the line.

Farmers on both sides of the border, they are faced with this uncertainty every day as far as what do we plant, how much are we going to get for our allocation. They may have troubles getting loans for what they need because of that uncertainty.

So I'm absolutely aware of how much that uncertainty can affect an entire regional economy. And I don't think that it's too premature to discuss having a framework to then use what would need to be some of the technical people to start looking at this.

But what's difficult is when you -- if we were to establish a framework and some bedrock principles on which if we can agree on these things, then let's turn it over to the geeks, if you will, and I say that with all the love in the world for the scientists, but the difficulty is when you're going to have a framework set up and then be litigating and trying to settle it at the same time in terms of resources, again, very limited resources that would have to go towards full-blown litigation on one hand and developing individual scientific models, but also working with scientists getting together in a group and trying to come up with some answers to this.

I understand that this case has been going on for a long time but not relative to many other complex interstate water cases. I understood that Texas is saying we need to get to trial right away because we're being irreparably harmed.

We certainly disagree with that and say that there's an adequate remedy of law to the extent that they've not received what they should be.

The farmers are clearly, in Texas, receiving what they need for their irrigation purposes, given that about half the water going over there is being used for municipal supplies instead of farming supplies.

So I would just urge us not to be rushing headlong, if necessary. It's not necessary to get there by a certain time; it's necessary to get it right. And if there's -- if we're able to develop that sort of framework and come to those sorts of bedrock principles, and I'm not saying we would be able to, but we're very much amenable to trying to do that at this stage.

But we would then have to approach Your
Honor, if we are able to make some progress, and see how that might factor into how this case goes along.

And that gives me just -- I want to bring up
one other point, if I could. You brought up early on in this case the idea of bifurcation, especially bifurcation of liability and damages.

And at this point, as you've heard so much today, there's no agreement on a period of record on what apportionment there is, what the rights and obligations of each of the parties are. All we have is what each party is saying is their position, and any damage calculations would be made based on what each party says is their position.

It seems to make a whole lot more sense from a standpoint of judicial efficiency to determine what rights and obligations are and whether they've been met or not, who has been damaged, and to what extent they've accrued liability before you start to engage in the very expensive and time-consuming procedure of calculating those damages, when, depending on how the Court rules, those calculations and all that work may well be moot down the line.

And I haven't talked to the other parties about this, but $I$ did want to raise it today since you had raised it earlier, and we haven't talked about it for a while, and it seems like now we're looking at how the case might be developing over the future, it might be a good time to revisit it.

Certainly not something we would have to do today, but $I$ at least want to raise it as an issue. THE SPECIAL MASTER: Well, just a second -- one second, Mr. Somach.

If what you're proposing, Mr. Roman, is that we suspend discovery to allow for some negotiation --

MR. ROMAN: Not at all.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: -- I'm not interested in doing that.

MR. ROMAN: No, not at all.
THE SPECIAL MASTER: Actually, to be honest with you, the more I've kind of gotten into it, the less I'm inclined to bifurcate.

I'm not -- as I more fully appreciate what all the issues are, there may be some argument about any bifurcation of a remedy, but certainly not as to the damages. I don't think -- I don't think you can separate liability and damages in this case.

Now, you know, if we decide that the damages are $X$, then there's going -- there may have to be a separate discussion on, okay, how do you remedy those damages. But if -- but if -- you know, to use an old adage, there's no harm in talk.

If New Mexico is doing a lot of things wrong but Texas is still getting its water because you
figured out some way to do it and compensate them in some other way, well, then I don't know that Texas has much to complain about.

So to be honest with you, I'm less inclined the more I get into the case. But I'm open. I mean, you know, as we get towards trial management, I certainly think this case may be tried in stages, that's a very common way to do trials like this.

I can see, for instance, I don't know how many days it will take, but $X$ number of days where we do nothing but put on historians, and then $X$ number of days where we do nothing but put on hydrologists. Now, those will be long days.

But, you know, I can see where we might not do a traditional, okay, the plaintiff puts on his whole case A to Z, the State puts on his whole case A to Z, you put on your defense, you know, we may look at it in specific issues.

All right. Having said that, Mr. Somach?
MR. SOMACH: Well, you said a lot of what I was going to say. I just want to say the State of Texas is always open for discussions, and Mr. Gordon, others within the state have, I think, made that clear. So I just want to put that aside.

Secondly, you've already indicated this. We
do not want a stay in this case, whether it be discovery or the case itself. We think it's important to move forward toward trial.

We agree with you that bifurcation is not appropriate. In fact, we've got damages and economic issues that we will be submitting to New Mexico on May 31 st when our expert reports are due. It's part and parcel of our case in chief.

To the extent that remedies might be appropriately dealt with after there's a determination of liability and the scope of damages, I think that is something, however, that makes sense in the scheme of things. So $I$ just wanted to at least articulate Texas's position.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Mr. MacFarlane or anybody else want to speak?

MR. MACFARLANE: I don't have much else to add on this point, Your Honor. I think, candidly, I think the parties are probably still too far apart to engage in meaningful settlement discussions at this time, although, you know, the United States will always sit down and listen to a proposal from anybody. But I think the case should proceed on the track it's on right now.

THE SPECIAL MASTER: Anything else that we
need to discuss, any scheduling or other issues that have become problematic, beyond what we've talked about so far?

All right. If not, then we're adjourned.
Thank you, everybody.
MR. MACFARLANE: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. ROMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. SOMACH: Thank you.
WHEREUPON, the within proceedings were concluded at the approximate hour of $2: 09 \mathrm{p} . \mathrm{m}$. on the 2nd day of April, 2019.

*     *         *             *                 *                     * 


## REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF COLORADO )
) ss.

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER )
I, RICHAEL M. SILVIA, Registered
Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter, Colorado Realtime Certified Reporter and Notary Public, State of Colorado, do hereby certify that the said proceedings were taken in machine shorthand by me at the time and place aforesaid and was thereafter reduced to typewritten form, consisting of 205 pages herein; that the foregoing is a true transcript of the questions asked, testimony given and proceedings had. I further certify that I am not employed by, related to, nor of counsel for any of the parties herein, nor otherwise interested in the outcome of this litigation.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed my signature and seal this 10th day of May, 2019.

My commission expires September 18, 2021.

S/ Richael M. Silvia
Richael M. Silvia, RPR, CRR, CRCR Certified Realtime Reporter
Commission No. 20054027487

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| 18:23, 20:8, 20:12, |  | 167:7, 167:25, |  | 141:2 |



